

ABSTRACTS FOR CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

Alison Bailey (Illinois State University): “Reconceiving Surrogacy: How Should Western Feminists Think about the Globalization of Commercial Gestational Surrogacy?”

In the context of her observations about science and race, Sandra Harding once observed that “the Baby M case could be the forerunner of the use of poor and third world women’s wombs to produce children for economically advantaged European American couples” (1986, 2003). Harding’s predictions are practically a reality. Commercial gestational surrogacy is now a transnational phenomenon. Can Western feminism’s “Post-Baby M” observations on surrogacy, as it is practiced in the global north, simply be extended to make sense of this emerging market? Or do we need to rethink surrogacy in light of globalization? If so, what theoretical tools should we use to make sense of this growing practice?

My discussion begins in India, which is well positioned to lead the world in commercial gestational surrogacy: labor is cheap, doctors are highly qualified, English is spoken, and infertility practices unregulated. Surrogacy is a bargain for Westerners, who pay up to one-third less than they would at home; and a boon for many Indian women, who can earn up to fifteen years’ income per pregnancy.

Outsourcing surrogacy to India, however, must not be met with a parallel exportation of U.S. feminist theory. Surrogacy does not occur in a cultural vacuum; it must be re-addressed in light of globalization. I argue that a Reproductive Justice framework is the best approach to Indian surrogacy because it reveals troubling contradictions between women’s lives as surrogates and as mothers of their own children. Reproductive Justice is rooted in the belief that “a woman’s reproductive destiny is directly linked to the conditions of her community, and that these conditions are not just a matter of choice and access.” It uses three overlapping lenses to identify, address and organize against reproductive oppression: reproductive health (which addresses service delivery), reproductive rights (which focuses on legal issues), and reproductive justice (which focuses on coalition building). I apply each lens to Indian surrogacy, but pay particular attention to reproductive health.

India has one of the highest maternal mortality and pregnancy-related morbidity rates in the world and basic health services are beyond most women’s reach. If this is the primary group from which surrogates are drawn, then we need to ask: *Should surrogacy be promoted in a country with such an appallingly poor record on women’s health?* As surrogates, Indian women earn good money and have decent housing, nutritious food, and top-notch medical care. If these basic needs are more available to them as surrogates than as mothers of their own children, then Indian women are granted more reproductive rights when they are birthing for others than when birthing their own children. The resources directed at a pregnancy are not only a strong indicator of the intended parents’ wealth, but also of the social value of the pregnancy. They are tied directly to the market value of the fetuses, rather than to the woman’s labor or personhood. Contradictions are a strong feature of injustice, and our conversation on Indian surrogacy ought to begin here.

Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin, Madison): “Living Towards Future Selves: Moral Imagination and Feminist Ethics”

In her study of women’s biography Carolyn Heilbrun uses Sartre’s words to define genius as “not a gift, but rather the way one invents in desperate situations.”¹ We recognize the courage of women who lived against oppressive gender norms when there were no examples to follow, but less is said about their inventiveness. Moral theorists have become increasingly interested in imaginative responses to desperation in the form of oppression, be it sexism, racism, poverty, violence or homophobia. While the concept of ‘moral imagination’ is gaining currency, there is no consensus on how to conceive of imagination or its role in practical reason. In this paper I will draw on work in feminist ethics to develop a concept of moral imagination as an aspect of practical reason distinct from moral perception and judgment.

¹ Heilbrun, Carolyn. *Writing a Women’s Life*. Ballantine Books: 1988, p. 44. Sartre says this in the introduction of his biography of Jean Genet.

Most theories of practical reason include belief, desire, knowledge, motivation, perception and judgment as central components. While nuanced accounts of moral perception (responsiveness to morally salient particulars) and moral judgment (assessment of particulars in light of general principles) draw attention to the roles of emotion, experience, identity, relationship and context in moral agency, they do not provide the theoretical resources needed to explain “creative” moral action. Even quite nuanced concepts of moral perception and judgment do not fully explain the ability to act in ways that transform moral perception, to act well in the absence of relevant experience and rules of thumb or to realize radically unexpected alternatives. Examples of such actions include consciousness raising, assertions of self-respect and efforts at non-violent conflict resolution. I argue that the inclusion of imagination in a theory of practical reason helps make sense of the notion of creating new moral possibilities and creates new possibilities for feminist ethics.

Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario): “Sexual Identity, Gender Identity and Fashion: Why Recognition Matters”

This paper explores questions about the ethical significance of fashion in the context of debates about sexual citizenship, identity politics, and rights to recognition.

I want to begin with the concept of the sexual citizen. Moral and political philosophy in the liberal tradition has typically described citizens in the language of abstract and idealized personhood. This citizen is perfectly rational and autonomous and finds his home in the public realm. Feminists have criticized this concept of the disembodied citizen as either smuggling in norms of masculinity (not really abstract at all) or as impossibly unrealistic as the basis on which to build moral and political theory. Queer theorists likewise criticized the liberal citizen as attached to the norms of heterosexuality and as entrenching the public/private divide. Insofar as GLBTT rights claims get voice in the liberal account it’s in the public realm—in the workplace, the legislature, the courtroom—and all mention of sexuality is left at home in the private. But this ignores public expressions of queer sexuality and allows in GLBTT moral and political agency only when sexuality is abstracted away. In contrast to the abstract citizen of political philosophy, the sexual citizen moved in the public realm as a sexual being. “The concept of sexual citizenship bridges the private and public, and stresses the cultural and political sides of sexual expression. Sexual privacy cannot exist without open sexual cultures. Homosexuality might be consummated in the bedroom, but first partners must be found in the public space of streets, bars, and media such as newspapers and the internet” (*GLBTQ Encyclopedia of Culture*). According to cultural theorist Jeffrey Weeks, the ‘sexual citizen’ is a recent phenomenon (*Theory Culture Society*, 1998; 15: 35-52). Making private claims to space, self-determination and pleasure, and public claims to rights, justice and recognition, Weeks writes that the sexual citizen is a hybrid being, who tells us a great deal about political and cultural transformation and new possibilities of the self and identity.

One of the rights claimed on behalf of the sexual citizen is the right of recognition. Queer theorists have argued that gay men, lesbians, transgendered, and transsexual persons don’t merely want the same rights as the sexual majority. Rather a large part of what the queer community wants is to be recognized as having legitimate identity. That is, queer activists want to be recognized as queer citizens. But recognition as a sexual citizen, being seen as a group member, being able to speak as a member of a group, is often not a simple matter. Recognition will depend on issues of power, appearance, and context.

To give a simple example, one can be seen and identified as a queer femme in Toronto or San Francisco while in smaller towns and cities such an option doesn’t exist. To dress in a feminine fashion is, in some locations, to invite being misread. In a recent book, *Looking Like What You Are: Sexual Style, Race, and Lesbian Identity*, Lisa Walker tackles this problem from the perspective of lesbian identity and the problem of recognition for women who are lesbians but who aren’t seen as such. In Walker’s chapter, “How to Recognize a Lesbian,” she argues that there are both benefits and costs to strategies of visibility. While Walker’s work examines visibility from the perspective of the feminine lesbian, I plan to explore recognition and visibility as issues for bisexual women as well as other women with fluid sexual identities (such as those who identify as “queer” or “pansexual.”) Drawing on popular culture (for example, *The L Word*) and on the recent phenomena of the lesbian clothing boutique (see Boutique Mad-Ame in Montreal), I want to explore the link between fashion and recognition in the context of queer culture and political claims of rights to recognition.

Megan M. Burke (University of Oregon): “Thinking with Braidotti: Doing Feminist Philosophy and Becoming New Kinds of Subjects”

As a baby of the third wave, I am skeptical about our lack of visibility outside of the university, and I am wary that the dominant form of my feminism is in the form of papers reappropriating misogynist philosophy. As much as we have pushed the boundaries of philosophy, we are not done. In an effort to dislodge our comfort in making feminist thought, we must continue to challenge how we *do* it. Obviously, this is not a new idea. Rosi Braidotti makes similar claims in 1993² and many others have done so before and after her. Braidotti, though, unabashedly asks the important questions that rarely seem to come out in our philosophical publications: What would it mean to radically abandon traditions of philosophy and become other? What is at stake for feminist philosophers in the willful surrender of “high theory”?

In “Embodiment, Sexual Difference, and the Nomadic Subject,” Rosi Braidotti claims there is much for feminists to gain from thinking about our relationship to how we do philosophy and how we should proceed as feminists who do thinking. Braidotti suggests a new way of doing feminist philosophy that challenges linear and normative ways of thought and that situates a new feminist subject. In returning to Braidotti’s article, I aim to show how her way of theorizing holds critical implications for our thinking subjectivity. I will suggest that to fully take up Braidotti’s theoretical style does indeed birth a new, much needed feminist subject, but one that is different from what Braidotti has in mind. While Braidotti sees the subject as an embodied subject of sexual difference that she stills names as woman, for a different, more politically viable feminist future, I suggest that we must be willing to expand this name of our subject from woman.

If we do follow Braidotti’s theoretical style, however, it is not necessary to re-vision woman. We will have arrived at a place in which our subject is so diverse, but so embodied that it will be impossible and unnecessary to name it as such. For, even as Braidotti notes, “woman” is a historically contingent construct that benefited the second-wave politics of feminism. This is not to say that we will abandon women, but rather that we will have more space for oppressed bodies: for those who are not women, but very much feminists, for those who may not have femaleness, but certainly have otherness, and oppressed bodies. By elaborating on the style Braidotti offers, I will show how a new subjectivity becomes our future. The issue at stake, here, however, is if we can approach this new theoretical style and undo our ties to the “the patterns of identification that the discipline philosophy expects, demands, and imposes” (2), will we be taken seriously? I propose that our ability to be heard relies on our ability to engender a new subject. Thanks to Braidotti and *Hypatia* for planting the seed, we have a departure point for this new kind of subjectivity.

Sylvia Burrow (Cape Breton University): “Emotion Uptake”

Having one’s anger dismissed fuels indignation and anger. What gives someone the authority to call my anger bitterness, resentment, or petulance—if anything—and what are the costs of emotional dismissal? My *Hypatia* essay, “The Political Structure of Emotion: from Dismissal to Dialogue” (Burrow 2005), takes up this question. Sue Campbell’s (1994, 1997) expressivist theory of emotion shows that emotion interpretation and expression is a social matter, with uptake of your expression of anger needed to assert you are angry. On this view, emotion dismissal indicates authority over others’ emotions. I argue in response that emotion interpretation is not essential to *possessing* emotion, although it is a critical political issue. Drawing upon Bubeck’s (2000) view of dialogical communities, I show that emotion interpretation is furthered differently according to one’s community: communities of separation give uptake to emotions suppressed by dominant ideologies while communities of negotiation challenge dominant others to acknowledge those outlaw emotions. Together, Campbell and I extend the feminist discussion beyond Marilyn Frye’s (1983) initial remarks on the uptake of anger, developing its political significance. Little work since has been devoted to the issue of emotion uptake, even while feminists acknowledge its political importance (see for instance Holmes 2004; Bell 2005; Bolter 1999). Most of the discussion (including that of Campbell and myself) centers on showing the harms and losses of emotion dismissal as a social practice evidencing power over another. I now see positive *moral* dimensions to emotion uptake, apart from practices of dismissal.

² Braidotti, Rosi. 1993. Embodiment Sexual Difference and the Nomadic Subject. *Hypatia*. 8.1: 1-13.

In light of my more recent research I propose that *empathy* is a morally valuable form of emotion uptake. Many theorists assign empathy some form of moral value (see for instance Carse 2005; Deigh 1995; Slote 2004; Gordon 1995; Piper 1991; Held 2006). But few, if any, discuss empathy as a form of emotion uptake. I plan to show that empathizing with another's emotion implicitly takes another's emotion as a legitimate response. This recognition both demonstrates trust and confirms another's emotional response as worthy. Thus, I plan to show that uptake is central to self-trust and self-worth. Self-appreciating attitudes such as these are central to autonomy, as theorists such as Dillon (1997, 2004), Blum (1994), McCleod (2002), and Govier (1993) argue. I recently extend this discussion by arguing that autonomy necessarily includes the cultivation and expression of bodily capacities as part of my view of embodied autonomy (Burrow 2009a). While I do not consider emotions as *simply* bodily phenomena, I maintain they are expressed through and by the body. The central aim of my proposed paper is to show that empathy is morally valuable as a means of fostering self-trust and self-worth, and hence encouraging emotional expression, each of which are essential to developing autonomy. I end with the suggestion that emotion uptake is valuable for *those who empathize*. Empathy is a defining feature of moral persons, moving us away from our own egocentric, biased, or otherwise favored points of view as we engage with others persons and their emotional responses (Burrow 2009b). Giving uptake to others' emotions is primarily morally important for those expressing emotion and, secondarily, is morally significant for those who empathize.

Ann J. Cahill (Elon University): "In Fits and Starts: *Hypatia* and Sexual Violence"

In 2002, Carine Mardorossian made the perhaps startling claim that "Sexual violence has become the taboo subject of feminist theory today...The kind of theoretical and genealogical scrutiny that other aspects of women's lives (the body, gender performativity, eating disorders, transgender politics, etc.) have occasioned is remarkably absent from studies of sexual violence.

Rape has become academia's undertheorized and apparently untheorizable issue (2002, 743). A quick glance through the table of contents of almost twenty-five years of *Hypatia* would indicate that Mardorossian's claim is not quite accurate; by my count, *Hypatia* has published at least 23 texts (articles, commentaries, and reviews) that relate directly to rape, many of which represent crucial retheorizing of its meanings and implications.

The attention, however, has been far from constant. Indeed, two important gaps stand out: one, the almost complete absence of articles in the first seven years of the journal's existence (the one exception being H.E. Baber's rather odd "How Bad is Rape?"); and two, the lack of a special issue devoted to questions of rape and sexual violence. Although 1996 did witness a special issue devoted to violence in general, an issue that included Claudia Card's highly influential article "Rape as a Weapon of War" sexual violence itself has never taken center stage at *Hypatia*.

"In Fits and Starts: *Hypatia* and Sexual Violence" will trace the role that the journal has played in the ongoing development of feminist philosophical thought on this crucial topic. In the course of surveying articles ranging from the central to the underappreciated, I will argue that at least one interesting pattern emerges: namely, that (with Card being the exception) articles on rape have mostly emanated not from established scholars, but from thinkers relatively early in their careers (Laura Hengehold's pieces [1993, 1994] are excellent examples). I will also note that *Hypatia* seems poised to re-institute the silence of its first years; after a 2004 discussion of Card's Atrocity Paradigm, only two articles addressing rape have appeared in its pages (Freedman 2006, Wellman 2006), and even these were not solely or primarily concerned with theorizing sexual violence per se. Yet current scholarship on rape, again energized by comparatively junior philosophers, is moving forward at a remarkable clip (see, for example Nicola Gavey's "Just Sex? The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape" [2005], Louise du Toit's "A Philosophical Investigation of Rape" [2009], and the collection edited by Renee Heberle and Victoria Grace, "Theorizing Sexual Violence" [2009]). I will conclude by arguing that the re-emergence of rape as a central topic of feminist philosophical thought is one that *Hypatia* should enthusiastically support.

Lorraine Code (York University): “How to Think Globally–Revisited”

This proposal responds to the section of the conference Call for Papers that reads: “if you are a *Hypatia* author, return to a paper you published in the journal and reflect on how thinking in this area has changed, what new directions are taking shape.” My intention is to revisit my “How to Think Globally: Stretching the Limits of Imagination,” *Hypatia*. Vol. 13 (2), Spring 1998, 73-85. (Reprinted in Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding, eds., *Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a multicultural, postcolonial, and feminist world*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.)

In this new presentation I will address three movements in feminist theory that were not yet on the table when I presented the first draft of this paper as part of a Symposium on “Cultural Relativism and Global Feminism” at the 1997 APA Pacific Division meetings. Participants were asked to address “the apparent dilemma posed by the normative demands of cultural relativism when they clash with *our* firmly held moral belief of what is just and right,” and to propose a new “theoretical model” to counter the culturally imperialist threat implicit in “the global optimizing strategy of the utilitarian approach...reinforced by deontic rationalism.”

First, I will examine a new emphasis on *exposure*, for which I am indebted to the work of Adriana Cavarero (and Judith Butler), and which informs my current work on vulnerability. Although there is a sense in which vulnerability is a universal human circumstance, thus that analyses of it need not face the “normative demands of cultural relativism,” in an equally significant sense this universality is merely superficial. Vulnerabilities are both universal in their ubiquity, and highly particular: their particularity tends to drop out of sight in generic beliefs “of what is just and right.” I am indebted, also, in my thinking about these matters to Debra Bergoffen’s 2003 *Hypatia*, article: “February 22, 2001: Toward a Politics of the Vulnerable Body,” on which I will also draw in this rethinking.

Second, I will frame the issues I discuss in the 1998 *Hypatia* paper more directly within the conceptual apparatus I develop in my 2006 book, *Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location*. This is a position I was developing, and to which I allude at several points, in the 1998 paper. Here I will show how it has begun to realize its potential, particularly in relation to the central thematic issue of thinking globally, and of exposure/vulnerability as I am working to articulate their implications for “thinking globally”—if indeed that phrase retains its salience now.

Third, I will consider the the implications of the new epistemologies of ignorance for thinking about the limits of imagination, amplified through a fuller understanding of the effects of the social imaginary than I was able to develop at that time. Especially interesting in relation to the “global” theme is Shannon Sullivan’s meditation on “White Ignorance and Colonial Oppression” in Sullivan and Tuana, eds., *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance*, which contributes to the vulnerability and the ecological themes of this proposed paper in ways that are both instructive and innovative.

Sarah Conrad (University of North Texas): “Toward a Queer Environmental Justice: Examining the Geography and Theoretical Connections of ‘Gayborhoods’ and Environmental Justice Areas”

In the 1997 *Hypatia* article “Toward a Queer Ecofeminism” Greta Gaard challenged the ecofeminist community to take sexual diversity and the erotic seriously by incorporating queer theory into scholarship that examines the connections between gender and nature. While much work is (undoubtedly) still needed for connecting queer theory and ecofeminism, further application of Gaard’s work could occur within environmental justice studies. The environmental justice movement has successfully targeted racism, classism, and sexism as driving forces that support the harm of people and the natural environment; however, little examination has been given to sexuality and its role. Furthermore, much work in environmental justice has highlighted the role of women and communities of color in grassroots activism, but little of the literature has examined the role of queer women and queer communities. This paper will attempt to fill this void by examining the geographical and theoretical connections of queer communities and communities of color in and near environmental justice areas. Due to the historical development of U.S. urban areas, queer communities and communities of color often sprang up next to each other as the ‘straight’ and ‘white’ community moved further from the urban centers. These historical movements allowed poor communities of color facing environmental justice issues to reside near and/or adjacent to economically flourishing gay communities of mostly ‘white’ (and many times predominantly male) inhabitants. The unique placement of such communities raises several questions that will be explored in this paper: Do queer communities adjacent to communities of color in environmental justice areas improve or

distract from the force of the environmental justice activism? What is the effect, for example, of the gentrification of areas that often accompanies the so-called 'gayborhoods'? Does such gentrification create further problems for nearby poor communities of color? Also, how does this ground level connection of the two types of neighborhoods, both with unique forms of oppression and grassroots activism, impact earlier arguments of queer theory with ecofeminism? And, finally, how can Gaard's insight, connecting different-but-related political movements and theories, be extended to environmental justice movements without losing the feminist emphasis articulated by Gaard?

Susan Dieleman (York University): "Revisiting Rorty: Creating Feminist-Pragmatist Epistemic Resources"

I was in high school when *Hypatia's* special issue on Feminism and Pragmatism was published in 1993, and it was at least a full decade later when I first read it and was inspired to write a dissertation on the same topic. I see myself as carrying on the project begun in that issue of exploring the similarities and dissimilarities of feminism and pragmatism.³ In this paper, I will focus specifically on the ability of Richard Rorty's post-Rationalist, discourse-oriented brand of pragmatism to provide feminist theorists and activists with an understanding of the methods most effective in achieving social progress.

Feminist engagement with Rorty's work has consisted primarily in criticizing various facets of his claim that social progress is achieved through ironic redescription. Such criticisms include, for example, that Rorty's account of liberal irony requires a sharp delineation between public and private. As Susan Bickford points out, Rorty is neither ignorant of nor unsympathetic to feminist critiques of the public-private distinction, so it is surprising that he brings it back as a necessary condition of his liberal program.⁴ Rorty's explanation of the role of the ironist in social progress is also criticized, this time by Nancy Fraser, who argues that it does not accurately reflect the history of the feminist movement, which is better represented by the counterpublic sphere than it is by Rorty's prophetic characterization.⁵ And finally, despite his attempt to "woo" feminists,⁶ Rorty's open endorsement of reform over revolution has been criticized for being simply too conservative to be of any use for feminism.⁷ While these sorts of criticisms have been invaluable in pointing out areas of Rorty's work of which feminists should be wary, I argue that they can in large part be mitigated by locating them within the broader context of Rorty's philosophical and political commitments, which we are now in a better position to understand and thus revisit more than fifteen years after the publication of the *Hypatia* special issue.

More specifically, I will recommend that Rorty's account of ironic redescription can be of use to feminist theorists and activists when it is understood in concert with his account of justification. Unfortunately, this latter aspect of Rorty's work has received little attention. This is not surprising, perhaps, as Rorty himself contends that a study of justification is really only of interest to the philosopher. But in this paper, I contend that bringing together Rorty's private discourse of redescription with his public discourse of justification will allow feminists to discover new methods for animating social progress that could prove useful in an increasingly postmodernist society, where the battle for gender equality is best waged between the equally hazardous poles of relativism and universalism. I will conclude this paper by offering some examples of the ways in which a combination of irony and justification has served feminism in the past, and would be well-suited to achieving further feminist aims.

³ See, in particular, Charlene Seigfried, "Shared Communities of Interest: Feminism and Pragmatism," *Hypatia* 8:2 (Spring, 1993) pp. 1-14, and Phyllis Rooney, "Feminist-Pragmatist Revisionings of Reason, Knowledge, and Philosophy," *Hypatia* 8:2, 15-37.

⁴ Susan Bickford, "Why We Listen to Lunatics: Antifoundational Theories and Feminist Politics," *Hypatia* 8:2 (Spring, 1993) pp. 104-123.

⁵ Nancy Fraser, "From Irony to Prophecy to Politics: A Response to Richard Rorty," *Michigan Quarterly Review* XXX:2 (Spring, 1991), pp. 259-266.

⁶ Richard Rorty, "Feminism, Ideology, and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist View," *Hypatia* 8:2 (Spring, 1993) pp. 96-103.

⁷ Susan Bickford, "Why We Listen to Lunatics: Antifoundational Theories and Feminist Politics," *Hypatia* 8:2 (Spring, 1993) pp. 104-123.

Alex Dressler (University of Wisconsin, Madison): “Feminist Philosophy and a Feminist History of Philosophy: Towards a Feminist ‘Platonism’”

Taking the history implied in its title seriously, the journal *Hypatia* has charted an alternative venue for feminist readings of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy for over two decades. In this paper, I consider the role of the feminine in the work of that male subject who has shaped “Western” philosophy as we know it and to whom *Hypatia* has been no stranger, Plato. Reviewing Plato’s appearances in *Hypatia*—from the material furnished by his work for histories of women in philosophy (*Hypatia* 1.1 [1986] 42-46) to the role that his discourse of desire and metaphysics has played in modern philosophy (*Hypatia* 3.3 [1989] 28-80; 21.4 [2006] 124-146, e.g.)—I suggest that philosophical and historiographic exigencies at the time of *Hypatia*’s founding have set the tone for subsequent representations of Plato in its pages, privileging the “essentialist” Plato of the “personal” and “metaphysical” dialogues, like the *Symposium* and the *Timaeus*, over the “political” Plato who put women, embodiment, and sexual equality at the center of his political utopia in Book 5 of the *Republic* (but cf. *Hypatia* 17.4 [2002] 235-238).

Reviewing the problematic tradition of feminist interpretation of Plato’s *Republic*, I supplement the unresolved “essentialist”/anti-“essentialist” feminist debates that focused on Plato in the pages of *Hypatia* in the 1980s and early 1990s with reference to the similar impasses reached in a set of debates that pre-dated *Hypatia* in the 1970s—debates in which the case for and against the ostensibly pro-woman agenda of Plato’s *Republic* was contested (Pierce 1973, Dickason 1973-74, Garside Allen 1975, Annas 1976, Saxonhouse 1976, e.g.). Against this background of feminist intellectual history, the debate that continued in the pages of *Hypatia* through the ’80s and ’90s shifted from the question of Plato’s “feminism” to the question of his representation of embodiment, metaphysics, and the discourses of desire, thereby supplementing one unresolved debate with another.

In my paper, I consider the genuine contradiction in Plato’s philosophy of women represented by the diversity of his dialogues—essentialist in the “personal” and “metaphysical” dialogues, radically “constructivist” (progressive?) in the “political” dialogues. In doing so, I show that the irresolution of the debates of the 1970s and ’80s and of Plato himself arises from the difficulties both of recognizing *and* representing the paradox at the core of Plato’s account of human subjectivity. In closing, I attempt to show that the endless *contradiction* of feminist responses to Plato and Plato’s response to himself may result from a *paradox* at the core of his treatment of the feminine. Taking recourse to the emerging appreciation of the paradoxes of subjectivity associated with Judith Butler and some “third wave” feminists of the 1990s and 2000s (*Hypatia*, 12.3 [1997]; 15.1 [2000] 1-22, e.g.), I attempt to expand *Hypatia*’s historiography of feminist philosophy by reviewing past, present and future directions for feminist work on this ancient thinker.

Juli Thorson Eflin (Ball State University): “Moving through Epistemic Disability and Epistemic Damage”

In “Coming to Understand,” Nancy Tuana put her finger on something exciting. She stimulated me to link epistemic ignorance, standpoint theory and virtue epistemology and relate them to human flourishing. I connect epistemic ignorance and standpoint theory via the metaphor Marilyn Frye develops in the last chapter of the *Politics of Reality*. To greatly oversimplify, Frye develops a stage metaphor where patriarchal loyalists (re)enact a reality for the ‘king’ who symbolizes all those who largely accept the dominant patriarchal worldview and whose vision defines the limits of ‘the real.’ Epistemic ignorance is bound with this limiting of what is ‘real.’ The result is a notion of “epistemic disability.” A community that epistemologically disables its members encourages the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of epistemic ignorance. To flesh out the relationships between epistemic disability and virtue epistemology, I use two sources. First, Lisa Tessman’s “Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression as Morally Damaging” shows how oppression inhibits flourishing. This results in “moral damage.” Tessman cautions us against portraying oppressed groups as disabled or damaged, for doing so opens the possibility to further oppress. Yet the damage must be clearly articulated if it is to be repaired. Second, Linda Zagzebski’s *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* provides a bridge from moral damage to epistemic damage through her development of virtue epistemology. The result of my ménage à trois (epistemic ignorance, standpoint theory and virtue epistemology) is to claim that feminism—the work of feminists and feminist theory—provides us with a way to turn epistemic disability into epistemic damage. The advantage is that a disability is usually thought of as something an individual cannot change, but an individual can, with the help of an epistemic-community, repair epistemic damage. If

damage can be repaired at least to some extent, then the loci of epistemic ignorance can be discovered and addressed, and with it understanding, cognitive authority, and epistemic flourishing is increasingly possible.

Marilyn Friedman (Vanderbilt University; Charles Sturt and Australian National Universities): “Oppression and Coerced Wrongdoing”

This project carries forward some of the themes of Lisa Tessman’s *Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics and Liberatory Struggles*, which was the subject of a symposium in *Hypatia*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July-September 2008), pp. 182-216.

Tessman’s book focuses on forms of moral damage to which people are particularly vulnerable as a result of living under oppressive conditions. First, there is the likely loss of opportunities to develop the sorts of virtues and character that contribute to flourishing. Second, the virtues people need to develop for coping with oppressive conditions may themselves interfere with the flourishing of those who have such virtues. These virtues for a politics of resistance may require self-sacrifices or moral trade-offs by the agent that leave her with regrets and unfulfilled moral “remainders”.

This paper carries these themes forward by considering another sort of “burdened virtue” to which oppressed people are especially vulnerable (although it can affect any moral agent). In addition to preventing people from developing the virtues for positive flourishing, oppressive conditions may also coerce people into engaging in outright wrongdoing. This may happen, not as part of a politics of resistance against oppression, but simply as a mode of self-preservation under oppressive conditions. Threats by dominant and powerful persons and groups can especially coerce those who are already vulnerable because of relative powerlessness and low status. Out of fear for the safety of themselves or what they most care about, oppressed persons can be coerced into wrongdoing they would not otherwise undertake.

This paper considers the specific case of female terrorists. For the sake of discussion, the paper rests on the assumption that terrorism is *prima facie* wrong and ignores the real possibility that it might have a “just cause” in some cases. Based on this assumption, this paper explores cases of female terrorists who appear to have been recruited to terrorist wrongdoing not because of political commitment to the terrorist movement in question, but rather because of pressures on them pertaining to their female status and its vulnerabilities in their communities. In some “honor” cultures, for example, some female terrorists had been regarded as having committed some sort of sexual transgression that “dishonored” them and their families. Terrorist recruiters appear to have persuaded a few of these women to engage in suicide terrorism as a way to restore their family honor and redeem themselves.

The question arises about whether women recruited to terrorism in that way are responsible for their terrorist wrongdoing. They appear to be victims rather than perpetrators of wrongdoing. Yet this determination has to be made cautiously lest it perpetuate that part of the oppression of women that consists in belittling women’s moral and political agency. This paper explores the moral significance of some of the vulnerabilities and compromises experienced by those female terrorists who are moral agents of wrongdoing under conditions of oppression.

Karen Frost-Arnold (Hobart and William Smith Colleges): “Finding the Future of Feminist Epistemology in the Legacy of Feminist Ethics”

Since the early years of *Hypatia*’s publication of feminist epistemology, feminist epistemologists have been boundary crossers. Exposing the political dimensions of knowledge, feminists have blurred the borders between epistemology, political philosophy and ethics. But as Lorraine Code has noted in her *Hypatia* reflection on the reception of her own work, boundary-crossing feminist philosophers have faced challenges due to the absence of a recognized field with which their work can be identified (Code 1994). Code attributes some of the lack of attention to her work on epistemic responsibility to the lack of a readily available niche in epistemology within which to raise both ethical and epistemological questions about epistemic virtue. Fortunately, the development of social epistemology as a legitimate field now presents such a niche. Here, I demonstrate how a social epistemology of trust presents opportunities for feminist epistemologists. However, to grasp these opportunities, epistemologists must learn a lesson from the legacy of feminist ethics—we should abandon the assumption that epistemic communities are, or should be, populated by epistemic agents who are equals.

In feminist ethics, Annette Baier has shown how a concentration on voluntary agreements between roughly equal parties prevented ethicists from recognizing the importance of trust as a fundamental moral concept (Baier 1994). Analogously, in the epistemology of science, the concentration on the mature lead scientist as the paradigmatic epistemic agent has obscured the extent to which science depends on trust between unequals. However, if we expand the community of epistemic agents to include not only lead scientists but scientists-in-training (e.g. post-docs and graduate students) and also entities that fund science, we discover a vast network of relationships of trust between unequals. These trusting relationships are epistemically important. As Helen Longino argues, the objectivity of science depends on the quality of the transformative criticism present in the scientific community (Longino 1990 and 2002). But avenues for transformative criticism are lost when scientists-in-training cannot trust their senior colleagues to be trustworthy mentors. Similarly, as recent work on the manipulation of science by special interest groups shows, there are dire consequences for the objectivity of science when powerful corporations are untrustworthy partners to the scientists whose work they fund (McGarity & Wagner 2008).

Given how pervasive inequality is within the scientific community, I argue that the objectivity of science does not require “equality of intellectual authority,” as Longino suggests (Longino 1990 and 2002). Instead, objectivity requires healthy trusting relationships between unequal members of the community. By abandoning the assumption of equality and instead focusing on trust between unequals, feminist epistemologists can avail themselves of the tools of feminist ethicists, such as Baier, who have outlined norms for healthy trusting relationships. For example, I show how Baier’s test for the moral decency of a trusting relationship can be used as an epistemic criterion for the epistemic health of a scientific community. In this way, boundary-crossing feminist epistemologists can establish their future in social epistemology by drawing on the legacy of feminist ethics.

David Garfinkle (University of Washington, Seattle): “Elizabeth Barry Confronts the Hobbesian Man: Towards a Feminist Historiography”

Christine Di Stefano’s 1983 article as published in *Hypatia: Reborn* reminded scholars of the necessity to consider the *ideology of masculinity* in our political analyses. The Hobbesian vision of human nature, with its political order of the passions “where insecurity and fear are the primary constants” and maternal power is absent, continues to revel in the political theatres and media of our wider contemporary society. I would suggest that a feminist analysis of the Hobbesian Man continues to have wide theoretical import and offers to my field of theatre history a particular benefit worthy of our reconsideration. Di Stefano’s critique provides important lessons not only for the cultural biographer and the theatre historian but in her philosophical and methodological considerations she offers the potential for a feminist model of historiography.

A primary site of early modern and masculinist modes of public education, the two Restoration theatres housed a dynamic inter-subjective play of heroic subjects and victims, of actors, authors and audience members. Specific theatre events provide direct evidence of the Hobbesian ideology, while others offer contradictory evidence. The historical figure of an actress who lived from 1658 to 1713 offers a unique perspective for three selected excavations of the Hobbesian ideology. As one of the first female professionals on the English stage, Elizabeth Barry was known as the greatest actress of the 17th century.

In any historical project to formulate the life and work of a particular female figure, different ideological assumptions of the “self” can confuse the figure and the historian. For one example, the official biographical entry of Barry’s life makes no mention of a mother. This source of evidence appears to fit the Hobbesian vision of a human being, confirming paternity, and yet the absence of a mother cannot merely be an accident. I propose there may be a trans-historical approach to the self in biography that can recognize the material, educational, and acculturative factors, as well as the social relations of the female historical figure. To reflect on the Hobbesian metaphor of people as mushrooms, I must ask, “whose minding the mushrooms?” to suggest how an ideology can delimit biography.

A second situation to test the Hobbesian notion of human as orphan arises in Barry’s most famous role as Monimia in Thomas Otway’s *The Orphan*. This case reveals a contemporary view of orphans as represented in the popular theatre. In the contrasting features of the feminine orphan which both confirm and challenge the Hobbesian notions of the passions

and of human nature, I hope to explain how a feminist epistemology can revision the reconstructive projects of theatre history.

There is no doubt that in specific Restoration public projects we can see the Hobbesian contribution to the institutionalization of Femininity in early modern Anglophone culture. My third focus outlines historical treatments of Elizabeth Barry to propose how a participatory intersubjectivity in the making of history can inform the critique of masculinist ideological assumptions in a model of feminist historiography.

Lori Gruen (Wesleyan University): “Ecofeminism and Environmental Justice: Maintaining Alliances”

In the Spring of 1991, *Hypatia* published a special issue on Ecological Feminism, the first collection ever published of explicitly philosophical articles on the subject. In October of that year, the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit was held in Washington, DC, and the Principles of Environmental Justice were articulated. Since that time, analyses of race, ethnicity, and gender and their intersections have played critical roles in understanding and addressing a variety of environmental problems, yet tensions between ecofeminist theorists and activists and environmental justice proponents remain. In this paper, I will first briefly reflect on the development and history of ecofeminism and identify how these tensions emerged. I will then propose ways to continue to build and maintain alliances between ecofeminism and environmental justice in both theory and practice.

MA Jaimes Guerrero (San Francisco State University): “Is There a Nexus Between Indigenous Women and Feminists for ‘Indigenous Feminism’? With a Gender Perspective in Transnational Movement Activism for Socio-Political Justice and an Emphasis in Latin America”

This research paper proposal for presentation is in the arena of history and cultural studies, and for multidisciplinary perspective on women and gender studies with cross-cultural/national comparisons through the Americas that illustrate transnational movement activism for socio-political justice. The methodological approach is in the context of a rhetorical critique in selected publications for critical analysis and synthesis. The main thematic are wealth and poverty, health and environment, globalization and neoliberalism, Indigenism/Indigeneity and ecology that intersect with issues of gender/sexism, race/racism, class/classism. This paper focuses primarily on the writings of R. Aida Hernandez Castillo, with particular emphasis on her essay “Zapatismo and the Emergence of Indigenous Feminism,” to be juxtaposed to Maruja Barrig’s essay “Latin American Feminism: Gains, Losses, and Hard Times.” Both essays are published in *Dispatches from Latin America: On the Frontlines Against Neoliberalism* (Ballve and Prashad, eds., South End Press, 2006).

It is the intent of this paper to address whether there is a nexus between indigenous women and others in these transnational movements in Latin American countries and U.S. feminists (ethnic and women and gender scholars among them), in the cause for socio-political justice from elite oligarchies, and in what has been termed as “indigenous feminism.” It will highlight the case of Mayan Zapatista in Chiapas, Mexico, who are seen and treated as an insurgency group by the reactionary national government there, with special interest in the women’s leadership representation in this “rebellion.” This paper will also cite my earlier writing on the Zapatista Uprising (published in *Ha, Ha, Ha Chiapas!*, E.Katzenberger, ed., City Lights Press). There is a tie-in with my more recent publications, on “Biocolonialism/Biopiracy and Indigenism,” in targeting of indigenous peoples and their respective cultures for genetic engineering and biotechnology as objectified research subjects (from published essays on the Human Genome Diversity Project, by Indiana University Press, A. Aldama, ed., 2003 and Alta Mira Press, M.Riley, ed. 2004); in this research there is an updated gender perspective that prefers indigenous women as human research subjects in tracing human origins. The work is critical of the negative impact of global trends and the ideology of neoliberalism behind it, with roots in reagonomics, and through global vehicles, NAFTA, and CAFTA. Rigoberta Menchu’s criticism of NGOs in the misrepresentation of indigenous peoples/ women’s rights is also noted. It concludes with the dissonances as well as synergies that are evident among Indigenous women and feminists, and the need for more diverse inclusivity in the discourse, and by recognizing that Feminism is an absolute known, but should be perceived as a pluralistic and active verb, from “ethno-feminist” perspective to “multicultural feminism,” and compared to “transnational feminism.” This

paper also addresses the plausibility of an “indigenous feminism” or “feminist indigenism” in terms of what is meant by “activist scholarship.” This is premised on my earlier work as co-editor and contributor (in *Hypatia*, vol.18, #2, Spring 2003), in what I contextualize as “patriarchal colonialism” on “Implications for Native Feminist Spirituality and Native Womanism.” Among these transformative movements for socio-political justice, women activists are protesting the widening gaps between wealth and poverty, health and the environment, while also striving for more gender equity and leadership. In addition, there is a need to work towards what is meant by an ecological worldview for gender equity and environmental justice in these neocolonialist times.

Kristen Intemann (Montana State University): “Twenty-Five Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?”

More than twenty years ago, Sandra Harding distinguished views that are still largely seen as constituting the terrain in feminist philosophy of science. In particular, she distinguished and endorsed “standpoint feminism” over “feminist empiricism,” which she described as the view that instances of male bias are merely cases of “bad science” that could be eliminated if scientists more rigorously adhered to empiricist methods and norms for scientific research (Harding 1986; Harding 1991, 111-20).

Since that time, countless articles in *Hypatia* have been devoted to clarifying, strengthening, and defending both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism (Tuana 1992; Hennessy 1993; Campbell 1994; Harding 1998; Harding 2004; Anderson 2004; Clough 2004; Sobstyl 2004). Increasingly sophisticated forms of feminist empiricism have emerged, which do not fit Harding’s characterization (Campbell 1994; Anderson 2004; Clough 2004) and some have attempted to incorporate the insights of standpoint feminism (Campbell 1994). Standpoint feminism has also become more nuanced and many of its proponents seem to endorse empirical success as a criterion of theory choice and have distanced themselves from interpretations of standpoint claims that would clearly distinguish it from feminist empiricism (Harding 1993; Wylie 2001; Wylie 2003; Rolin 2006; Wylie and Nelson 2007). Thus, it is no longer clear what differences there are between contemporary versions of these two views or whether it makes sense to think of them as competing epistemological theories. Some, in fact, have suggested that while feminist empiricism is a theory of (scientific) knowledge, standpoint feminism might be interpreted as a methodological claim that is compatible with feminist empiricism (Campbell 1994; Crasnow 2006).

I will argue that the strongest interpretations of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism are now in substantive agreement in several ways; however, there remain important differences between them. Specifically, they offer different criteria for achieving scientific objectivity. For example, although both views advocate for greater diversity within scientific communities, they offer different accounts as to *why* diversity is important. As a result, the *kind* of diversity that each view takes to be necessary for objective scientific communities is also different. In addition, proponents of the two views seem to have slightly different conceptions of empirical success, and standpoint feminists have often been leery to fully embrace empiricist norms for theory choice (Harding 2004).

Yet to the extent that differences exist, I argue that each view needs to adopt tenets of the other in order to fully meet objections they face. Feminist empiricists need to adopt the standpoint account of diversity in order to address problems with the way they treat values in science. Standpoint feminists, on the other hand, need to more fully endorse a feminist empiricist conception of norms for theory choice, which is important to countering worries about epistemological relativism. Of course, if each view were to adopt these features of the other, they would become identical. Thus, feminist empiricists and standpoint feminists should recognize a joint interest in merging towards “feminist standpoint empiricism.”

Sarah Black Jones (Northern Michigan University): “A Call for the Elimination of the Marriage Culture”

Feminists have argued at length that *patriarchal* marriage is both deeply flawed and dangerous. Claudia Card goes further: in her 1996 *Hypatia* essay, “Against Marriage and Motherhood,” Card argues it is not merely patriarchal marriage, but the institution of legal marriage itself, that is dangerous; so dangerous, she argues, and so fundamentally

misguided, that in spite of its economic attractions same sex couples should neither desire nor pursue the “right” to marry. In fact, she claims, were it achievable, they should work toward its eradication.

Joan Callahan’s *Hypatia* article “Same-Sex Marriage: Why it matters—At Least for Now,” agrees with Card that marriage is “profoundly morally flawed,” yet argues lesbian and gay activists should nonetheless pursue the right to marry. Callahan’s argument is fundamentally pragmatic: she argues that because the probability of securing fundamental economic rights outside of legal marriage is so remote and because the misery that lack of certain economic and social protections causes is so real, one should—in effect—accept the evils of the marriage institution to secure these economic and social privileges .

This article proposes that we take seriously both the unfreedoms and the slavery analogy discussed in Card’s article. Extending both Card’s arguments and her conclusion, I conclude that *no one*—neither hetero nor same sex couples—should participate in the marriage institution. For securing the legal right to marry, rather than correcting the moral wrongs of marriage, serves to perpetuate, cement, and further legitimate a culture that thrives on manipulation, coercion, inequality, and a politics of division. Legal marriage, I argue, creates a culture of coercion, a culture of marriageism that is deeply oppressive: whether one resists or embraces the “marriage club,” one is punished.

I argue that though Callahan’s firsthand account of the miseries of economic discrimination is riveting, it fails to appreciate the extent to which those (and other) evils will be further cemented, normalized, and legitimated by demanding the “right” to marry. While it is, of course, egregiously unjust, arbitrary, and discriminatory to accord important protections to heterosexual unions but not homosexual ones, the right remedy for this cannot be to embrace those institutions that are the basis of such broad misery; correcting some injustices by embraces and legitimating the institutions from which they stem is not the right or prudent answer. Rather, we must envision more radical forms of unions that serve not merely our economic, but our psychological and social interests as well. Hence, I argue, both same sex and heterosex couples should resist the economic lure of the marriage culture and instead work toward a more radical vision for the basis of economic protections.

In arguing for this conclusion, my paper develops in greater detail two aspect of Card’s paper: the unfreedoms that are wed to legal marriage, and the analogy between marriage and slavery. Though Card’s focus (like Callahan’s) is largely confined to the physical and material dangers of marriage, my paper is focused more directly on the *psychological* consequences of these unfreedoms and the resultant marriage-culture with we are all forced to live. I argue this resultant “marriage culture” is responsible for far too much misery; it is oppressive in Marilyn Frye’s classic sense, as it virtually requires—on pain of punishment—that one either gain membership into or explicitly support it. This in turn, eliminates for most individuals (wed or not), the possibility of genuine friendships, human fulfillment, and happiness.

I conclude that, once recognized, the ubiquitous oppressive consequences of legal marriage for the larger culture are so deep, so great, and so lasting that participating in or defending the marriage institution is deeply irresponsible. The price of admission is simply too high. Like slavery, the institution is not “fixable,” and its physical dangers and psychological demands make its eradication the only intelligent moral option.

Hye-ryoung Kang (University of Nevada, Reno): “Bases for Women’s Transnational Solidarity in the Context of Globalization”

Globalization has engendered transnational spheres and circumstances of justice in which transnational collectivities have, make, and act upon their justice claims across borders. Such transnational collectivities do not exist as a single universalized global agency, but are multiple and fluid. Also, the transnational collectivities have raised diverse justice claims from their specific locations.

Given that there are neither globally shared justice claims nor a unified single agency, a crucial question comes to the fore: what are the bases which might make possible solidarity among different types of multiple women’s collectivities? Are current philosophical concepts of solidarity adequate for explaining transnational solidarity such as is necessary for making transnational justice claims and waging struggles? If not, which concept of solidarity is adequate for explaining solidarity among such heterogeneous transnational collectivities? In this paper, I am going to address these questions.

I shall begin with a sketch of current non-feminist philosophical accounts for political solidarity—Jurgen Habermas’ cosmopolitan solidarity based on shared humanity as world citizens, and David Miller’s national solidarity based on their shared national identity. I argue that none of these concepts adequately explains how solidarity is possible among groups across borders with various kinds of justice claims and how seemingly various groups with different justice claims converge toward achievable, congruent goals.

In order to address the issue, I propose a two-tier concept of transnational solidarity for global justice, according to which simple bases for building intra-collectivity solidarity should also be considered bases for struggling together for building inter-collectivity solidarity. I argue that globalization has engendered such a two-tier base for transnational solidarity of various transnational collectivities across borders. Bases for inter-collectivity solidarity among women’s transnational collectivities do not need to be a sense of shared identity or commonality among them. Thus, though justice claims of transnational collectivities are different and there might not be a unitary, shared consensus among the diversity of their justice claims, an overlapping consensus does in fact exist insofar as their justice claims and struggles all center on the unjust structural aspects of neo-liberal globalization, and such structural bases can be bases for building solidarity across difference among collectivities. Finally, I examine how this concept of solidarity can address a dilemma arising from dominant feminist concepts of solidarity—the issue of building coalitions among different groups without committing essentialism or assimilation.

Jean Keller (College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University): “Sara Ruddick, Transracial Adoption, and the Goals of Maternal Practice”

This essay picks up on Alison Bailey’s call, in her 1994 *Hypatia* essay, “Mothering, Diversity, and Peace Politics,” to attend to the diversity of maternal practices. Bailey provides an in depth analysis of the goals that guide African American motherhood and uses this analysis to challenge Sara Ruddick’s claim that she has identified three goals internal to all maternal practice. In this essay/talk I identify and describe three goals that structure transracial adoptive maternal practice. Contrary to Bailey, however, I argue that these goals are compatible with the general outlines of Ruddick’s universalistic account of maternal practice.

In her groundbreaking book, *Maternal Thinking*, Sara Ruddick proclaims “all mothers are adoptive” as a way to convey her conviction that motherhood is not defined by biology, but by engaging in the work necessary to rear a child. Ruddick’s metaphor suggests that the study of adoption can provide new and important insights into maternal practice. Yet this implicit claim remains undeveloped because Ruddick fails to consider actual adoption practices when constructing her theory. This essay addresses this lacuna in Ruddick’s thought by exploring what we can learn about maternal practice if we take adoption, specifically the transracial adoption of Korean American children, as our starting point for thinking about motherhood.

When Americans first began adopting Korean war orphans 50 years ago, they were told to treat their adopted Korean children as they would an American birth child. In a society trying to learn to be colorblind and in which closed adoptions were the norm, discussions of race, birth parents, and birth country/culture were avoided by well meaning adoptive parents. The transracial adoption literature is rife with stories told by adult adoptees of the psychic costs that resulted from such well meaning but misguided advice. This body of literature suggests that there are goals internal to transracial adoptive maternal practices that are distinctive from Ruddick’s goals of preservative love, fostering growth, and socialization for acceptance.

These goals include using narrative to foster children’s sense of family belonging and to help them make sense of the often fractured pieces of their adoption story; providing children with the cultural knowledge that will eventually help them construct an ethnic and cultural identity that bridges their birth and adoptive country; and training children to resist racism. The first two goals become visible in transracial adoptive maternal practice because they must be undertaken by adoptive parents intentionally and reflectively, if they are to parent well. Yet I will argue that these goals are also key (but typically unreflective and unintentional) components of the maternal practices of biological mothers who keep their children. Training children to resist racism, by contrast, is a goal specific to raising children of color in white dominant societies.

Examination of the Korean American adoption literature, then, reveals three distinctive types of maternal goals: 1) Universal maternal goals, such as those described by Ruddick; 2) Goals that are universal and internal to all maternal practice but only become reflective and intentional—and hence thematized—for some groups of mothers; and, 3) Goals that are specific to and constitutive of some forms of maternal practice but not others. The understanding of maternal practice provided in this essay advances our understanding of adoptive and biological maternal practice both by adding to our list of maternal goals and by providing a framework that allows us to conceptualize similarities and differences among maternal practices.

Jim Lang (University of Toronto): “New Tools for Transforming the Master’s House⁸: Engaging the Other via Non-Agnostic Playfulness”

The idea for this paper was sparked by a question raised during a session at the most recent FEMMSS⁹ conference: *Why don’t [more] philosophers working in mainstream epistemology “get” feminist epistemologies?* As one of the former now working in the latter, I suggest part of the answer may lie in the selection, quality and application of the tools of the philosophical trade. When my sole epistemological tool was a Kantian¹⁰ hammer most of my work involved fashioning my problems into Kantian nails with which I dutifully repaired and maintained the Master’s House. In this paper, I suggest that mainstream critiques of feminist work often induce the frustration implied in the question, above, because the critics ignore crucial details of feminist work that will not reduce to a Kantian nail; what remains must necessarily be the nail, they conclude, to which they can then apply their reliable hammer.¹¹ The impasse seems impenetrable. In my own case, it was only when I was tricked, cajoled and teased into playing with new conceptual tools that the process of transformation began, which brings me to my focus on some of the feminist toolmakers who helped me to rebuild my “house.”

Among the works of feminist conceptual toolmakers, none is more timely, timeless, better-used or more suited to the job of communicating across multiple differences than is the work of Maria Lugones—in particular, her pivotal article in *Hypatia*, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” (Lugones, 1987). Aside from the powerful application of these concepts to education (see Ford, 2007) in my paper I suggest that Lugones’s work of contrasting agonistic with non-agonistic playfulness could represent a key conception for engaging mainstream philosophers, a tool that could be used to reveal porosity in the barrier mainstream epistemologists describe as dividing otherwise incommensurable positions. My feminist teachers did not, as mainstream epistemologists are wont, expect instant conversion via doxastic voluntarism. They invited me to “play.” “Just play with some ideas and see what happens, if anything.” Were I to have asked, “But, what are we playing *for*? What does winning look like?” I might have been told, “It’s not that kind of playing.” Invitations to play are not unlike invitations to “World”-travelling, Lugones’s deceptively simple explication of oppressor-oppressed relations. A multiple-purpose tool, “World”-travelling invites reflections and transformative (if painful) possibilities relative to privilege, power, racism, situatedness, and multiplicity.

In my paper, I include the other feminist tools and “toolmakers,” key to my own philosophical/personal transformation. For example, Audre Lorde’s enduring maxim, “The master’s tools will not dismantle the master’s house,” is also itself an important conceptual tool (Lorde, 1984). Lorde’s idea helps me to understand mainstream epistemology *as* a construction and that the tools used to maintain it are similarly *man*-made. Donna Haraway’s explication of situatedness helps me to understand some of the implications of multiple, partial, situated knowledges (Haraway, 2004). Marilyn Frye’s conception of arrogant perception helps me understand my role as an oppressor (Frey, 1983) while Megan Boler’s conception of a pedagogy of discomfort helps me understand the inevitability of my pain when engaging with difficult knowledges. Her use of Minnie Bruce Pratt helps me understand that I gain: “...a way of looking at the world that is more

⁸ Reference to Lorde, A. (1984). *The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House*. In *Sister Outsider* (pp. 110-113). Berkeley, CA: The Crossing Press.

⁹ Association for Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics, and Science, 2009.

¹⁰ I use Kant as a key representative but not the sole foundation of mainstream epistemology.

¹¹ A useful example: Harvey Siegel critiquing Lorraine Code’s critique of Kantian epistemology: Siegel, Harvey (1998) “Knowledge, Truth and Education,” in Carr, David (Ed.), *Education, Knowledge and Truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse*. London and New York.

accurate, complex, multi-layered, multi-dimensional, more truthful...I gain truth when I expand my constricted eye, an eye that has only let in what I have been taught to see” (As quoted in Boler, 1999, p.182).

Lorraine Code provides me with a whole new drawer of epistemological tools that help me order, sort out, and discard some of my old tools (Code, 2006, among many other works). She also dissuades me from discarding all my old tools, acknowledging the impressive successes science has achieved through their use, which is why I suggest Audre Lorde’s injunction itself needs revision and reworking: Dismantling the master’s house, were it possible using the master’s or feminists’ tools, could set us adrift in Neurath’s boat (itself a marvelous conceptual tool). Rather, I suggest feminist theorists’ new tools can be put to work de-gendering and transforming the house to improve habitability for all who live within and by this imaginary.¹²

At issue remains the perceived intransigence of the mainstream philosophical community to engage with feminist theory. Some feminists will choose not to engage with critiques from beyond the “wall,” but I suggest that work also needs to be done to find new ways to permit access from the mainstream. With Code and others, I agree that no epistemological position is beyond the moral and that the claimed moral neutrality of modernist epistemology serves to animate oppressive scripts. I start my work with my own experience of transformation, which started with “playing” with feminist ideas. I learned that whereas many feminist philosophers are skilled with a Kantian toolset as well as with their new feminist tools, the same seems not to be the case for their critics. If, as Lorraine Code claims, feminist theorists are ushering in a new epistemological Copernican revolution and, in the process, are beginning work on an instituting social imaginary that is marked by continual self-reflection and interrogation, this work must include sharing the tools of the transformation with those laboring under the old “paradigm.”

I cannot claim that mainstream epistemologists will take up these new tools or that, if they do put them to use they will use them for the greater good. I can claim that feminist philosophical theory continues to transform my life—for the better. Feminist writers offer me the tools I need to change my mind and to re-imagine the worlds of Others—just in time, it seems, for my intersected sexagenarian, white, male self(s) to begin to redeem a life complicit in modernist-inspired epistemological misogyny. The move from an arrogant and frustrating quest for certainty among definitive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions to the ambiguous, uncertain, and humbling “world” feminist theory continues; it is at times and in turn intellectually exhilarating, mystifying, and painful. To the extent that I have been “worlded,” that I found these new tools crucial to my transformation, I suggest it is possible they may also help others to “get it.”

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Carole J. Lee (University of Washington, Seattle) and Christian D. Schunn (University of Pittsburgh): “Social Bases for Cognitive Critique: A Case Study of Peer Review in Philosophy”

Philosophers since Mill have construed rational dialogue and debate as epistemically beneficial since they catalyze the reevaluation of hypotheses, and of the reasons and assumptions on which hypotheses are predicated (Mill 1859). Longino goes so far as to argue that objectivity is constituted by these critical discursive interactions, so long as the community has public venues for criticism, is responsive to criticism, has shared evaluative standards, and exhibits

¹² A normative principle introduced by Lorraine Code in *Ecological Thinking*, op. cit.

tempered equality of intellectual authority (Longino 1990; Longino 2002). Like Solomon, we argue that empirical research raises philosophical concerns about whether rational deliberation should always be construed as being epistemically beneficial (Solomon 2006). This paper analyzes how social features mediate the cognitive evaluation of theories with a case study of peer review practices in philosophy, informed by data collected from editors of general philosophy journals, from journal websites, and from content-analyses of recent peer reviews for the Cognitive Science Society's annual conference.

Our research suggests that, as peer review is practiced in philosophy, there is room for stereotype based schemas to play a role in the cognitive evaluation of submitted work (Valian 2005; Haslanger 2008), as well as vulnerability to a systematic negative bias in reviewers' comments and evaluations (Amabile and Glazebrook 1982; Amabile 1983). Not surprising, perhaps, to some feminist philosophers (Moulton 1996), we found that comments in philosophical reviews are extremely negative when compared to psychology reviews. The negativity of such reviews have important cognitive effects: research in social psychology suggests that affect serves as a heuristic cue in judgments under uncertainty (Bless, Bohner et al. 1990; Clore, Gasper et al. 2001). We found that rejection rates for philosophy papers were much higher than for psychology papers—a finding consistent with an affect-heuristic style explanation.

We argue that these empirical findings—about the role of schemas and the role of negative biases and affect in evaluation—suggest that whether a piece of philosophical writing meets shared cognitive criteria may be partly determined by social features of dubious or unknown epistemic standing. Such effects are especially pernicious since they are cognitively inaccessible to epistemic agents (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Peters and Ceci 1982; Steinpreis, Anders et al. 1999). More generally, these results suggest that shared standards and the exchange of reasons and critique do not protect against dubious processes of cognitive evaluation. Like Wylie, we suggest a shift towards formulating norms about rational deliberation that are grounded in empirical research about conditions that facilitate and undermine epistemically laudable community-wide deliberation and debate (Wylie 2006).

Wendy Lynne Lee (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania): “Outsourced Surrogacy via In Vitro Fertilization, the Global Market, and Peter-Paul Verbeek’s ‘Technological Artifacts’”

In vitro fertilization (IVF) is typically conceived as a technology facilitating an otherwise “natural” reproductive process without which it might not be possible in particular cases. But, as many feminists argue, where the “natural” leaves off and the “technological” intervenes is far from obvious. Contrary, however, to some feminist views which cast such technologies as universally alienating, I'll argue that what defines our relationship to IVF is not necessarily that it alienates us from nature; it's that its appropriation through agencies that seek to exploit its marketability create these conditions—and that feminists interested in the relationship between social justice and the effects of globalization are well-situated to begin the task of reconceiving our relationship to technologies like IVF in more emancipatory ways. Consider a recent news story:

Anand, India—Every night in this quiet western India city, 15 pregnant women prepare for sleep in their spacious house they share, ascending the stairs in a procession of ballooned bellies, to bedrooms that become a landscape of soft hills. A team of maids, cooks, and doctors look after the women whose pregnancies would be unusual anywhere else but are common here. The young mothers of Anand...are pregnant with the children of infertile couples from around the world. The small clinic at Kaival Hospital matches infertile couples with local women, cares for the women during pregnancy and delivery, and counsels them afterward. Anand's surrogate mothers, pioneers in the field of outsourced pregnancies, have given birth to roughly 40 babies. (*Press Enterprise*, 1.3. 2008, p. 5)

We might read this as an “everyone wins” story of what IVF can accomplish. On closer scrutiny, however, the story raises serious questions about the exploitation of the surrogate, the economic position of the contracting couple, and the agency brokering the deal. All important questions: if, however, we focus solely on these, I suggest, we'll not only miss a valuable aspect of the story, but one that offers an emancipatory opportunity. Appealing to Don Ihde, Peter-Paul Verbeek argues that there are

...three different ways in which human beings can relate to technological artifacts. In the first, our perception is mediated by the technological artifact. In such a *relation of mediation* we are not directly related to the world but only are so via an artifact...A second kind of relation, which Ihde calls an *alterity relation*, is a relation not via an artifact to the world but to an artifact itself....The third kind of human-technology relation Ihde calls a *background relation*, in which technological artifacts shape our relation but do so by remaining in the background... (Verbeek, p. 123)

Verbeek resists characterizing our relationship to technology in universalizing terms, offering instead an account that postulates a relationship irreducible to technology's *uses* in particular contexts. The technologically mediated interface between the couple, the surrogate, and the developing fetus can be a source of ambivalence beyond the commodification of the surrogate/fetus insofar as the *technologizing* of the surrogate's body, her relationship to it, the couple's relationship to the surrogate and each other, are something more than is captured by traditional analyses of, say, exchange value. More than merely another case of economic coercion or trampled human rights, a feminist reading of Verbeek can show how our relationship to "technological artifacts" profoundly informs the ways in which we think about exploitation and oppression—and thus how we might think about such artifacts in light of our relationship to them in other possible contexts such as those more conducive to social justice.

Gerald Marsh (Arizona State University): "Trust, Testimony, and Prejudice in the Credibility Economy"

In her recent book *Testimonial Injustice*, Miranda Fricker explores some of the ways stereotypes can lead to quasi-perceptual, prejudicially diminished assessments of credibility she calls 'testimonial injustices.' In my paper I examine some cases that seem deserving of the title 'testimonial injustice', but that do not fit the form of Fricker's central cases. I argue that these cases seem to suggest that there is a relationship between trusting broadly construed and testimony. I suggest that the proper prophylaxis against testimonial injustice is the cultivation of a virtue I call 'apt trusting.' If I am right, then while Fricker's cases are indeed injustices in their own right, their remedy does not call for the development of the virtue she calls 'testimonial justice.'

I give reasons to think that taking someone's word in a testimonial exchange is a special case of trusting that person. Further, I argue that the decision whether to enter into a trust relationship is mediated by a structurally similar quasi-perceptual credibility assessment as the decision whether to accept some bit of testimony. If this is correct, then one should expect to see injustices arise in decisions about who to trust. I argue this is precisely what we find. In light of this, it seems natural that the remedy to prejudices in quasi-perceptual credibility assessments relevant to testimonial exchange should parallel the remedy to prejudices in quasi-perceptual credibility assessments relevant to trust relationships more generally.

Kristin McCartney (DePaul University): "Not Lesbian Philosophy"

If I am slow getting to the point, if I do never get to one, I take it from Joyce Trebilcot that this may be evidence of some engagement in ideas. I have only been sitting with Joyce Trebilcot's work for a couple of days now, but her writing on the motivation to thought, her commitment to *not* trying to persuade other wimmin, and her preference for story-telling over theory-making is audacious and compelling. When a philosopher tries to 'restrain' her academic training for her own sake and for the sake of others, from the perspective of this doctoral candidate, she offers an account of thinking life that is as calming as it is bracing.

I ordered Joyce Trebilcot's book *Dyke Ideas: Process, Politics, and Daily Life* on Amazon.com after reading a notice of her death on a feminist philosophy listserv. The 1994 text is easy to find used for pennies (with \$3.99 shipping and handling). I imagine as an anti-hierarchist iconoclast she would have little use for hagiography and might even be suspect of a twenty-fifth anniversary celebration. But, scattered throughout the book, I also recognize the names of at least two speakers at this conference, Claudia Card and María Lugones, and the names of several *Hypatia* contributors, including Sandra Bartky, Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Marilyn Frye, and Jeffner Allen. Joyce Trebilcot's work fills me with joy, because it communicates her singular voice, but also because it communicates the real happening of feminist argument, collaboration and imagination.

In my lifetime, the ground for understanding feminism and The Women's Movement© has been salted in mainstream and radical academic circles with contempt for lesbian feminists. In my generation, it seems to me that lesbian feminist philosophy has slipped into obscurity even amongst wimmin who are lesbians and philosophers. And I mourn this, and, in mourning, it is tempting to assess where feminist philosophy has gone and where it should be, to rally a call for memory, codification, and gratitude.

But Joyce Trebilcot would probably point out that the spirit of dyke inquiry has already been compromised if we have become settled as philosophers or lesbians, if we expect academe to act as a space of conservation for endangered political discourses. Without denying the importance of herstory and analysis, I think her work gives us reason to suspend judgment while elaborating our motivations, renewing our creative license as creator-participants, and speaking out of our anger, beliefs, and experiences. Joyce Trebilcot would not tell us to do this, nor would she advise any single course of action. She offers in *Dyke Ideas*—and I just second the suggestion—that we give direct attention to what each of us enjoys, appreciates, and receives in thought. This activity or attitude does not endow a legacy, but it could well lift, at least for a moment, the accumulated burden of our ambitions.

Carolyn McLeod (University of Western Ontario): “Future Feminist Analysis of ART [Assisted Reproductive Technologies]”

A possibility that I see taking shape within feminist applied philosophy is more extensive criticism than what is now common within feminist reproductive ethics of the development of assisted reproductive technologies (ART). This criticism will draw from insights of the growing number of feminist philosophers writing on adoption. Some of these theorists, especially those with papers in *Hypatia* (Brakman & Scholz 2006, Park 2006, Quiroga 2007), have pointed to the serious bias—what Elizabeth Bartholet calls the “biologic bias” (1999)—within the ART industry in favour of reproducing biologically over reproducing or parenting in other ways, such as via adoption. Since the main goal of these authors is not to evaluate ART, however, they neither fully defend the above criticism, nor fully spell out its implications for the industry. (Should it be scaled back in some way or abolished even?) I believe that feminists concentrating on ART should investigate where the criticism about biologic bias leads in terms of accepting or rejecting ART.

Brakman and Scholz write that there is an “uncritical acceptance of the biologic [bias] ... among mainstream bioethicists” (59), but one could lodge the same complaint in fact against many feminist bioethicists. While feminist bioethicists certainly discuss the pronatalism that underlies the development of ART, a pronatalist bias is not the same as a biologic bias. The former simply favours bearing children over not bearing children, while the latter favours having children born or genetically related to you over having other children. The person with a pronatalist bias simply says, “bear children,” while the person with a biologic bias says, “if you're going to have children, have children to whom you are biologically related.”

I will illustrate why feminist insights about adoption can be so fruitful for feminist writing about ART. I will argue that the best arguments in favour of forms of ART that are particularly invasive and risky for women (e.g., experimental egg freezing followed by IVF or simply IVF) include the following premises:

- A. That biological reproduction is crucial to having a good life;
- B. That most women authentically believe, or will come to believe, that biological reproduction is crucial to having a good life.¹³

Drawing on both the adoption literature and some empirical literature about women's experiences with infertility, I will contend that any evidence we have in favour of A and B¹⁴ is equally evidence in favour of A* and B*, in which “biological

¹³ Other premises may include, C. That biological reproduction is so crucial to women's welfare and to their reproductive autonomy that scarce resources ought to be spent on ensuring that these women can reproduce; or D. That producing children using the relevant ART will not cause these children to have serious health problems. My interest lies mainly in claims A and B.

¹⁴ The evidence is weak, of course.

reproduction” is replaced by “parenting,” which can occur via adoption. Proving only this much reveals that the development of the relevant technologies lacks a stable ethical foundation.¹⁵

I hope that my paper will contribute to a quick flow of feminist insights about adoption into feminist philosophical analyses of ART. New assisted reproductive practices are on the horizon that could revolutionize reproduction for women, yet again. Egg or ovarian tissue freezing as insurance against age-related infertility is an example (Harwood 2009). We need the best feminist insights about procreation and parenting at our disposal when posing any challenges to these new technologies.

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Anjali L. Nath (Independent Scholar): “Ethical Exchanges with the Other: Western Feminist Solidarity and Teachings about the War on Terror”

The potential depth of any transnational intellectual endeavor is contingent upon the illumination of the power structures enabling, restricting, and simultaneously constructing the very knowledge project itself. This paper explores the role that feminist interrogations of transnational solidarity can occupy within emancipatory pedagogies through teaching feminist perspectives on the War on Terror in a Women’s Studies course. Lorraine Code’s “How to Think Globally: Stretching the Limits of Imagination” and Uma Narayan’s “Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism” (*Hypatia* Volume 13, Number 2 Spring 1998) are put in conversation with one another to scrutinize the negotiation of hegemonic power in feminist pedagogies. What implications might the insights of these articles offer to educators embarking upon such a highly politicized pedagogic endeavor? A focus upon U.S. complicity in manufacturing terrorism via wars and less direct offensive methods avoids such ethical pitfalls as a contextually impoverished prioritizing of the ‘backwardness’ of others and instead centers the potentially robust political agency of U.S. intellectuals in enacting stances of transnational feminist solidarity.

My interrogation of epistemic concerns surrounding various pedagogic approaches to teaching the War on Terror in the West is greatly indebted to discussions of cultural relativism in Code and Narayan’s articles. Their critiques of postmodern assertions that one can only know their localized conditions can considerably ameliorate liberal socialization to deny the potential for universal truths. First, Code acknowledges that cultural relativists are rightly compelled towards “vigilance against epistemic imperialism” in their pursuit of a respectful approach towards cross-cultural theorizing and strategizing (67). In an attempt to carefully manage localized and global approaches to domination, Code proposes “that responsible global thinking *requires* not just cultural relativism but a *mitigated epistemological relativism* conjoined with a ‘healthy skepticism’” (69). As a response to reductionistic universalizing discourse, such a limited approach allows for analysis of the local specificities of particular groups of women. This critical and mitigated relativism is certainly not the ultimate philosophical approach to understanding cultural difference, but is preferable to imperialist essentialism in engaging with Others (70). Code uses case studies from the Indian subcontinent to illustrate success in showing the significance of localized analyses within transnational logics, thus supporting the adoption of limited relativism as an instructive analytic endeavor to encourage teaching about the War on Terror.

¹⁵ Notice that failing to prove this much does not indicate that the science *has* a stable ethical foundation, because other premises (e.g., C or D) in the argument in favor of the science could be false.

Narayan's hesitations regarding a viewing of cultural relativism which she is analyzing the strongest version of as a healthy alternative to essentialist conceptions of "Other" cultures further enhances the conceptual framing of this pedagogic experiment. She points out that belief in universal sameness (essentialism) and difference (relativism) have both been deployed for imperialist aims and are both threats to feminism. Instead of such options, Narayan advocates looking to contextualized histories of colonial interactions to determine how and why Othering binary systems have been developed and perpetuated. Thus, her theoretical intervention would discourage re-inscribing simplistic Orientalist approaches to, in particular, militarized Islamic societies as barbaric, primitive, or uncivilized. My teaching about the War on Terror and engagement in solidarity work, then, is contingent upon consideration of Code and Narayan's above insights attempting to ensure that my approach is far from essentialist or uncritically relativist.

The War on Terror is a vital site through which U. S. citizens must come to fully recognize privilege and acknowledge social location within the broader transnational scheme of power relations. When Women's Studies courses within this nation fail to extend an analytic gaze outside of these national borders, an immense intellectual and ethical disservice is committed to ourselves and women transnationally. One of the major shortcomings of such an approach is the potential for national citizenship and empire to not be considered at the forefront of conversations regarding privilege and oppression, specifically, U.S. complicity in, and manufacturing of, oppression of foreign individuals, communities, and nation-states. My pedagogic and philosophic commitments center a warning of the colonizing and popular liberal multiculturalist approach to transnational feminist solidarity efforts while instead focusing upon analytic frames derived from consideration of subaltern perspectives.

Emily Parker (Santa Clara University): "Subjectivity and the *Féminin*: Between the Feminine as Repudiated and as Product"

The name "feminist," in light of its ever-rich diversity of meanings and associations, requires a reassessment in 2009. I would like to propose such a reassessment, one that would welcome its critics and reignite a conversation regarding the feminine and subjectivity, which has, by at least one scholar's standards, grown stale.¹⁶ *Hypatia* publications attest to a lively, explicit debate around this topic in the late 1980s and early 1990s; in my view the conversation since then has not grown stale so much as scholars have divided into vibrant camps which do not converse. Why? I would like to suggest that there is an important kernel of debate going unaddressed, that there are at least two conflicting futures projected by this name through readings of the notion of feminine subjectivity, and each challenges the other. Each is crucial, capturing an important moment of transnational feminist aspirations. And yet they cannot be made entirely consistent without significant ethical loss. Still, they are in implicit conversation, structuring many contemporary feminist conversations.

The first aspiration of the feminist is toward a feminine subjectivity, or a perhaps ironically insisted-upon dialectical other of philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse. Much feminist and womanist work explores such a possibility in the interest of ethical and political opposition exploring sexual difference. Luce Irigaray's *Speculum of the Other Woman*¹⁷ takes such an approach through mimetic readings in the history of philosophy, not seeking the invention of a new discrete subject, but for a subversive positionality and later for a discrete political presence. As Anne Caldwell suggests,¹⁸ without the possibility of opposition, one loses the very ground upon which to enter into dialogue as other than the reflections of the same "subject." Luisa Muraro,¹⁹ in response to Jana Sawicki's espousal of a "politics of difference,"²⁰ which would emphasize differences among women, has raised similar concerns. Through opposition, the feminine is able to be re-membered in dialogue; this something else would allow for a foothold not otherwise possible.

The second aspiration of the feminist is perhaps evident in the article mentioned above by Sawicki. For Sawicki, a politics of difference would theorize the differences among women, and this would put into question the very notion of a discrete feminine subjectivity. In contrast to the first, this aspiration rejects the very grounds for oppositionality. After

¹⁶ Zerilli, Linda M.G. 2005. *Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

¹⁷ Irigaray, Luce. 1985. *Speculum of the Other Woman*. New York: Cornell University Press.

¹⁸ Caldwell, Anne. 2002. "Transforming Sacrifice: Irigaray and the Politics of Sexual Difference." 17:4.

¹⁹ Muraro, Luisa. 1987. "On Conflicts and Differences Among Women." *Hypatia*. 2:2.

²⁰ Sawicki, Jana. 1986. "Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference." *Hypatia*. 1:2

all, there can be no subjectivity without an other, and this othering is precisely what the feminist, that which is feminist, that which espouses feminism(s), attempts to interrupt. Whatever revision of the repudiation of women's bodies might be possible through opposition, such opposition is predicated upon new vile others. Queer feminist theorists and feminist theorists emphasizing the imposition of cultural expectations for the "feminine" have developed this aspiration of the feminist. Judith Butler, as early as an article in *Hypatia* in 1989, expresses through a reading of the work of Julia Kristeva²¹ the notion that the feminine must be rethought as a *product* (rather than merely as an object) of the cultural norms of repression.

And yet it would be naïve to ignore the subjectivities projected by any articulation of feminist philosophy. Precisely when one thinks one has rejected or gotten beyond discourses of subjectivity, subjectivity will be most problematic. For *Hypatia*'s 25th Anniversary Conference I would like to present what I see as an important dispute that has structured numerous *Hypatia* conversations²² and yet has not received direct attention. For my own purposes, both aspirations of the feminist must be kept in play; feminist philosophy and theory must return to, cannot deny its own inevitable discussion of subjectivity. My interest will be to do so without settling definitively on either moment.

Chris Pierce (North Carolina State University): "No More Mrs. Nice Gay"

I got interested in the question of how the concepts of care ethics were expanding into the larger social domain when a colleague of mine in Social Work showed me some student papers from a class she taught at a nearby religious college. Many of her students admitted they just didn't take to so-called "social work values" such as client self-determination, inclusiveness, and concern for social justice. Some said they could never advise a woman to have an abortion no matter what the circumstances nor could they help a gay couple to adopt. Some said they would step aside and let another social worker handle these types of cases. Some said they would engage in preaching because they wouldn't be able to keep their views to themselves. My colleague thinks this school should not be accredited in Social Work. I think the expansion of the ethics of care into the realm of social and political policies and institutions—what some have called "socializing care"—has got a problem.

With respect to socializing care, for example, Virginia Held claims that people ought to care about whether the rights of all persons are respected. (*The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, 2006) Presumably this means that people should care about whether the rights of lesbian and gay persons are respected. But caring in this instance has not worked very well. It seems that large numbers of Americans do not, cannot, and never will care about the rights of gay people. A theory like Held's that promotes care as a more *fundamental* and *realistic* notion than rights seems counterintuitive in the face of the empirical and psychological claims I will discuss. The claims of those who assert the primacy of care ethics seem seriously flawed, at least when it comes to the case of gay and lesbian citizens.

I begin the paper with examples of the *Lack of Fit* between care ethics and social cases. It is noteworthy just how often the language used in describing the ethics of care does not entail caring about whether gays and lesbians have their rights. I then address the issue of *Care as Fundamental*, followed by sections on *Brain Research and Aristotle, Which Ethics is Real?*, and my conclusion. I discuss recent theories of empathy (George Lakoff, 2008, J. D. Trout, 2009) that show both how limited and how flexible the range of human empathy is. I argue that the evidence from cognitive science clearly does not support the view that care is the most fundamental or even the most realistic bedrock concept in moral theory.

Given the central role of the ethics of care in feminist philosophy, I believe that my critique is relevant to the themes of the *Hypatia* anniversary conference insofar as it points toward future directions of feminist philosophy especially as they pertain to gay people. Also, I make explicit how this paper challenges the focus of my contribution to the 2007 *Hypatia* issue on "Writing Against Heterosexism."

²¹ Butler, Judith. 1989. "The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva," *Hypatia. Special Issue: French Feminist Philosophy*. 3:3.

²² Not only that between Sawicki and Muraro, Butler and Irigaray, but also the implicit disagreement between proponents of exploration of the repression of the feminine and proponents of the notion of the feminine as a product of the cultural norms by which it is repressed. In my view, an important conversation has yet to be had in which these views enter into productive tension.

Shireen Roshanravan (Kansas State University): “Navigating Feminisms’ ‘Transnational Imperative”

This paper departs from two recent *Hypatia* essays by feminist philosopher María Lugones: “On Complex Communication” (2006) and “Heterosexuality and the Modern/Colonial Gender System” (2007). Both of these essays complicate the concept of “intersectionality” as a crucial feminist of color theoretical contribution to ending violence against women and their communities. Specifically, Lugones addresses the limits of this concept in navigating the formation of deep solidarities across difference (both within and beyond U.S. borders) and in historicizing the thoroughly mutual saturations of gender by race, colonial and global capitalist legacies. She thus highlights the significance of historicizing not only the critical dialogues central to the movement of feminist thought but also the colonial, racial, and global capitalist legacies that shape the violent gender formations of the present. In the process she elaborates the concepts of “complex communication” and the “modern/colonial gender system” to disrupt stubborn presuppositions of easy solidarity between differently marginalized peoples and to offer new frames of analysis that facilitate an articulate understanding of the oppressive and resistant interdependencies that shape liberatory possibility at the confluence of the local and the global.

Complex communication—as Lugones theorizes it—thrives on reading and recognizing opacity and is enacted through self re-creation and the forging of relational identities that never assume meaning prior to peopled encounters. The “modern/colonial gender system” views gender as a colonial concept that functions through the classification of peoples in terms of a “light” and a “dark” side. The “light” side became the hegemonic Western understanding of “gender” yet was reserved for the white bourgeoisie. It assumes sexual dimorphism, the patriarchal gender binary of man/woman, and heterosexuality. The “dark” side reduced the colonized to non-human beasts suitable to hard labor exploitation and rape as a means of “breeding” capital. Accordingly, the modern/colonial gender system disallows the reduction of gender subordination to issues of a universal patriarchy and thus halts the ease with which feminists can assume “woman” as the appropriate name for beings racialized “non-white” through the coloniality of power.

As “internationalization” (Moallem 2006) and the “transnational imperative” (Holloway 2006) garner momentum in the fields of women’s and gender studies, Lugones’s concepts of “complex communication” and the “modern/colonial gender system” are especially salient to the future directions of feminist philosophy grounded in a de-colonial praxis of global liberation. Minoo Moallem (2006) and Karla Holloway (2006) caution against trends in some transnational feminist work that does not destabilize the colonial/modern myth of progress and/or dismisses the violence suffered by “local” U.S. bodies of color in favor of the “broader” task of “knowing” about those beings who come to represent the “global.” These trends are linked to the presumed yet under-interrogated connections between U.S. women of color and transnational feminisms and the imperative of such connections in the global present. This paper explores how, when taken together, “complex communication” and the “modern/colonial gender system” offer methodologies that address these dangerous trends and facilitate a careful navigation of the complex terrain of transnational feminist praxis.

Alexa Schriempf (Pennsylvania State University): “The Lockean Witness: A New Name for an Old Idea (Move Over Descartes!)”

Susan Bordo is credited with establishing the idea of the Cartesian subject-knower. Although her article was first published in *SIGNS*, (11: 3, 1986), a score of essays (well over 60) have appeared in *Hypatia* since that date that address, use, or critique the Cartesian subject-knower in some way or other. With few exceptions, authors criticize the lack of a contextualized, material body in the Cartesian model. This lack of embodiment is taken to be the starting point for more robust models of self-hood and knowing. Particularly in feminist epistemology, models of knowing that are limited, perspectival, located, and above all else, embodied, are taken to be a corrective approach to the hegemony of Cartesian epistemologies grounding contemporary epistemic practices such those found in the sciences.

But what if the Cartesian knower was never really at the heart of the epistemic problem that feminists diagnosed, in keeping with the critique of the Man of Reason tradition that Genevieve Lloyd first identified, along with Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka? What if the Cartesian knower really *is* a ghost, as Louise Antony suggests when she describes Cartesian epistemology as “a programme that is *premised* on the irrelevance of bodily difference” but which, of course, may actually “reflect nonuniversal features of the theorist’s specific embodied position” (Antony 2002, 466). In my paper

for this conference, I will suggest that feminist theorists need to shift away from the idea of the Cartesian knower and toward something that I call the “Lockean witness.”

I speak of the Lockean witness rather than the Cartesian knower familiar to many feminist theorists because the Cartesian knower is not the only spectral figure haunting contemporary attempts to reconstruct modern epistemology. An overly individualist reading of modern philosophy has possibly obscured a more complex understanding of Locke as a culmination of the Cartesian metamorphosis of individual thinking and reflection. What Descartes began with the cogito, Locke, to a large extent, ended. That is, speaking in terms of overall effects, when Descartes helped pave the way for the recognition and endorsement of individual experience as legitimate and even as necessary for producing knowledge, Locke helped establish the means for adjudicating, evaluating, and giving credence to those experiences. More so than Descartes, Locke was working during a period in which the need for determining legitimacy was, quite likely, overwhelming. The Royal Society, for example, of which Locke was a prominent member, did not (and could not, pragmatically speaking) accept all letters and reports into its publications and archival records. What, then, was their means of adjudication? What was their source of authority? Among a variety of mechanisms that have been well-documented by modernists (the discourse of fact, the social construction of truth, a perspectival objectivity), there exists fairly well-established literature that examines “bodily governance” or “bodily regulation” as part of a set of modern practices devoted to the “appropriate care of the self” that made for the best knowers. We feminist theorists generally know that knowers have bodies, and that the most socially successful knowers in history have been those with the “right” kind of body (white, male, etc). So why do we persist in talking about the “Cartesian knower”—a ghost?

What the Lockean witness offers that the Cartesian knower does not is an understanding of how the epistemological, social, and political success of the knower comes to be inextricably interwoven with embodiment. This is something that the presumed disembodiment of the Cartesian knower cannot hope to explain. Thus I urge that our feminist future include a discussion of the Lockean witness as a logical development of the history of the Cartesian knower.

Cynthia A. Stark (University of Utah): “Abstraction and Justification in Moral Theory”

Traditional moral theories regularly rely upon abstraction. That is, they tend to formulate moral issues in terms of abstract principles or abstract persons. As abstract, these principles or notions of the person focus upon what is common to individuals while bracketing what is particular about them. This feature of traditional theories has been criticized by feminist philosophers. Critics claim that abstract moral theories encourage unresponsiveness to morally relevant particular aspects of individuals and their situations. Critics are worried, specifically, about the neglect of such particular features as e.g., one’s gender or race. In other words, they maintain that abstract moral theories are insensitive to oppressive social structures.

For instance, an abstract conception of the person, the argument goes, insofar as it stresses what’s the same about us, leads to a notion of equality as same treatment. But when people differ with respect to their place in a social hierarchy, treating people the same will not establish equality. Ensuring that people have the same legal rights or the same opportunities is compatible with pernicious social hierarchy.

I argue that feminist criticisms of abstraction are based upon a mistake. These criticisms do not distinguish between abstraction in the *justification* of moral principles and abstraction in the *interpretation* or *application* of those principles. My argument has four parts. First, I show that critics of abstraction are opposed to abstraction in interpretation or application. Second I show that advocates of abstraction use abstraction in the context of justification. Third, I argue that *this* use of abstraction does not entail a commitment to abstraction in *other* contexts of moral theorizing. For instance, a theory of justice that appeals to an abstract notion of the person to justify distributive equality is not thereby committed to any particular account of what distributive equality entails, nor to any particular way of applying a principle of distributive equality in non-ideal circumstances.

The fourth part of my argument is a defense of abstraction. To make my case, I discuss Lisa Schwartzman's interpretation of Elizabeth Anderson's critique "luck egalitarianism".²³ Schwartzman maintains that Anderson's critique succeeds because it does not abstract from, but instead engages, current social relations of power. I agree that this feature is an asset of Anderson's view. However, the success of Anderson's critique, I argue, rests on her use of abstraction in the context of justification. I interpret Anderson as defeating luck egalitarianism by 1) endorsing an abstract notion of the person that blocks key elements of the luck egalitarian account of distributive equality, 2) showing that, insofar as luck egalitarianism shares that ideal of the person, it misinterprets the implications of that ideal for distributive justice, and 3) showing that, at the level of application, both luck egalitarianism and Anderson's own theory, despite the use of abstraction, can countenance attention to particularity. The problem is that luck egalitarianism concentrates on the "wrong" particularities while Anderson's theory concentrates on the "right" ones. Therefore, the latter but not the former view can theorize adequately the harms embedded in oppressive social hierarchies.

Silvia Stoller (University of Oregon): "The Anonymous Gender: New Perspectives on Gender Identity"

From its very beginning feminist philosophy has critically reflected upon the anonymous being of women in Western culture. Accordingly, one of its primary aims is to make women visible and to liberate them from their anonymity. In contrast to this negative account of anonymity in feminist philosophy, I am arguing that in order to understand gendered existence, it is necessary to reflect upon its anonymous dimensions.

In order to introduce a positive account of anonymity I will draw upon 20th century phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas) which has demonstrated that anonymity is a constitutive part of experience. In accordance with these phenomenologists, I will argue that gendered identity exists not only by way of reflective judgment but also—perhaps even more so—in a pre-predicative state, that is, in an anonymous or latent form. With the help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), I will not only describe three different dimensions of anonymity in experience, but also introduce the idea of anonymity as a sphere of *indeterminacy* which resists any efforts of determination. I will argue that such a phenomenological account of anonymity can open new spaces for thinking gender in a non-essentialist and *non-determinate* way. Put differently, arguing for the indeterminacy of gender enables thinking the limits of determining gender and thus, allows thinking the possibility of a plurality of gender identities.

In this paper, I will refer to early feminist research on the interconnections between feminism and phenomenology as published in *Hypatia* (e.g., Bigwood 1991), continue my own specific research in feminist phenomenology (2000, 2005), touch upon a debate on the issue of anonymity in *Hypatia* 2002 (Weiss 2002, Sullivan 2002), and finally introduce a key-idea of my recent German Habilitation (2009).

Andrea Sullivan-Clarke (University of Washington, Seattle): "Mixed-race Epistemologies: A Possible Compliment to the Feminist Critique of Science?"

Hypatia's symposium on Sandra Harding's *Science and Social Inequality (SSI)* highlights a critical debate in philosophy of science: the need for a normative account of epistemologies underwriting scientific knowledge.²⁴ Simply put, how many epistemologies comprise the epistemological core of scientific practice? In her response to the challenges posed by her critics, Harding briefly considers three views.²⁵ The first, that the core is empty, is the least satisfying philosophically and politically. Philosophically, it neglects the assumed progress of science and politically, it leaves epistemic practice to the caprice of those in power (217). The second option is a pluralistic account, maintaining each epistemology as distinct from and incommensurable with the others (213). This view, however, underestimates the cooperative practice of science and its successes in resolving incommensurability (215).

²³ Lisa Schwartzman, "Abstraction, Idealization and Oppression," *Metaphilosophy* 37, 5 (October 2006): 565-587. Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" *Ethics* 109, 2 (January 1999): 287-337.

²⁴ See "Symposium: Sandra Harding's *Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues*," *Hypatia* 23.4 (2008) 182-219.

²⁵ Critiques were offered by James Maffie, Eduardo Mendieta, and Alison Wylie.

Finally, Harding considers a third possibility, called weak universalism—a standard guiding the choice of epistemologies comprising the core (213). Although not fully developed, Harding closes her paper with a call for more discussion on the topic. In this paper, I contribute to Harding’s project by suggesting the exploration of a previously overlooked area: the development of mixed-race communities. Using the grassroots movements of mixed-race Native Americans, I propose that the epistemology of this group, one on the cusp of becoming a community, is a possible complement to weak universalism.

Although the aims of feminist scholarship differ, two principles emerge: 1) that knowledge is socially constructed and 2) that gender, race, and/or class play a substantial role in a community’s account of knowing (172).²⁶ If race can contribute to feminism, then we should devote some attention to population dynamics. Given the ease of immigration and the inability to fully isolate communities, the presupposition of the homogeneity of populations seems outdated. So, too, are the traditional, essentialist conceptions of mixed-race individuals.

Historically, the government, as well as society, has focused primarily on the constituent races of mixed-race individuals, causing one to doubt their ability to form communities. Mixed-race Native Americans, however, are motivated to form communities given their historical exclusion from federal recognition as well as the internalized racism exhibited within tribes toward mixed-race members. As such, to what epistemic ends can this group contribute? Mixed-race communities offer a unique understanding of the natural world, enabling them to address the challenges posed by Harding’s critics, such as the question of epistemic priority, the incommensurability between standards, and the integration of differing critiques of scientific practice.

Unfortunately, the epistemic contributions of indigenous communities have been downplayed and overlooked. Yet, the formulation of scientific questions for research affects the well being of all communities involved. Unattached to a historic or static racial category, mixed-race Native communities, while very similar to Harding’s postcolonial indigenous communities, offer distinct formulations of scientific questions and scientific critique.²⁷ It may be that what is coming out of Indian Country is a new territory of investigation for feminist philosophy of science.

Helga Varden (University of Illinois at Urbana, Champaign): “The Priority of Rightful Care to Virtuous Care: A Kantian Critique of the Care Tradition”

Contemporary liberal theories of justice have been rightly criticized, first, for their neglect of care relations, and second, for their inability to deal with the inherent asymmetry, dependency and particularity constitutive of relations of care. Since liberal theories typically analyze all moral relations through the ‘hypothetical’ lenses of independent, autonomous individuals and through the lenses of such persons’ actual consent, these theories can make little sense of relations of care, and so typically have either allocated them to the private sphere—‘the man’s castle’—or simply silenced them. Over the last three decades, what is now called the ‘care tradition’ has been central to identifying this problem in liberal theories.

Though the care tradition is unified in its aim, it is not in agreement regarding exactly which type of critical analysis care relations require. We can make a rough distinction between two types of care theories, namely as determined by whether or not they believe that an account of care should be *added to* or *included as part of* a modified liberal theory of justice. Prominent care ethicists defending the former view maintain that a more complete ethic must comprise both an account of care *and* a liberal account of justice. An important challenge for them concerns how to combine these two accounts (of justice and of care). Some of these care theorists argue that the source of the problem in liberal theory is its assumption that justice is ‘prior’ to care, meaning that justice is the most fundamental and normatively prior virtue of the two. Indeed, in recent work, Virginia Held turns the priority around by proposing that care is prior to justice, meaning that care provides the framework within which justice can and should exist. The other type of care theory, most prominently,

²⁶ Hankinson-Nelson, Lynn. “A Question of Evidence,” *Hypatia*. 8.2 (1993) 172-189.

²⁷ For more information on Harding’s postcolonial indigenous communities, see Harding, Sandra. “Multicultural and Global Feminist Philosophies of Science: Resources and Challenges.” *Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science*. Eds. Lynn Hankinson-Nelson and Jack Nelson. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

perhaps, the one proposed by Eva F. Kittay, challenges this strategy by arguing that care should be incorporated as a constituent part of a revised liberal theory of justice.

Regardless of these differences between the two types of theories, I argue, they share with the liberal theories they criticize the fundamental assumption that virtuous private individuals can realize good caring relations on their own. Consequently, the need for a public authority in enabling good interactions is understood in fundamentally prudential terms and the proper sphere of state power is simply delineated by individuals' rights. On this view, it also follows that public right (the state's coercive power) is seen as in principle co-extensive with private right (the enforcement of individuals' rights). In the first part of the paper I challenge the first assumption that good care only requires virtuous private individuals. Until we give up this assumption, I argue, we cannot overcome the problems associated with taking the (inter)dependency, the asymmetry, and particularity constitutive of private care relations sufficiently seriously. In the second part of the paper, I turn to issues of economic systemic justice by challenging the second core assumption shared by care and liberal theories alike, namely that the state's sole function is to secure individuals' rights. I argue that these liberal theories' voluntarism makes it impossible for Held and Kittay to use them to overcome the problems concerning systemic injustice.

Though Kant has been a central target of much criticism from the care theorists, I conclude the paper by arguing that his position actually provides a way out of the identified problems. The proposed Kantian conception of care relations rejects both the assumption that good care requires only virtuous individuals and the assumption that the state's sole function is to remedy the common lack of individual virtue through securing individuals' rights against one another's vice. Instead, I suggest that *rightful* care, in an important sense, is prior to virtuous care, and that the state's primary function is not merely to secure individuals' rights but also to establish a public institutional whole that secures systemic justice. Consequently, the rights of the state (public right) are not coextensive with those of individuals (private right). Rather the rights of the state are comprised of private right (the private persons' rights vis-a-vis each other) and public right (the rights of the citizens with regard to the state's basic institutional structure). Hence, paying attention to how the public authority must set itself up as a *public* authority makes it possible see both how good caring relations require both private right (such as family law) and public right (such as public institutions securing systemic justice). Such a more complex analysis of care relations is required, I propose, in order for liberal care theories to take the asymmetry, dependency and particularity constitutive of relations of care sufficiently seriously.

Alys Weinbaum (University of Washington, Seattle): "Reproductive Labor in Biocapitalism"

Recent theorists of biocapitalism suggest that it signals the rise of new forms of extraction of surplus value. While some of these theories explore the commodification of life itself in the form of human eggs, sperm and zygotes, there is a gaping hole in the scholarship around the category of reproductive labor power as a commodity, especially in the context of surrogacy. While some feminist anthropologists and sociologists have examined the rise of a new surrogate underclass, and feminist philosophers have for some time explored the particular nature of reproductive exploitation, there is as of yet neither feminist work that firmly situates the rise of surrogacy within the larger context of biocapitalism, nor that which seeks to understand surrogacy within the wider social scientific discussion of the commodification of life itself.

This paper builds on the work of previous feminist scholars (many of whom have published on questions of surrogacy and reproduction in *Hypatia* over the years), and takes it in a new direction addressing the perceived conceptual hole in theorizing about reproductive labor power in our time. It explores the nature of reproduction in biocapitalism by situating surrogacy as the key to understanding new forms of reproductive exploitation that extend well beyond surrogacy and hark back to reproduction in bondage. The paper also suggests that one of the blockages to fully understanding reproductive exploitation today has had to do with the dominance of discipline bound, often social scientific, approaches to both biocapitalism and surrogacy. By way of redress, the paper explores how speculative fiction can be mined as a philosophical resource in understanding reproduction in the context of biocapitalism. In particular, it turns to the work of Octavia Butler, whose fictions about reproduction in bondage theorize the existence of a reproductive labor force on the one hand, and, on the other, limn the important linkages between contemporary forms of reproductive exploitation and chattel slavery.

The paper's principal contribution is examination of the importance of fiction to understanding reproduction in biocapitalism, and the importance of Butler's work in particular to limning the reproductive dimensions of the commodification of life itself. The paper also advances a fresh approach to the work of Butler, whose award winning fiction is often cast in the genre of the neo-slave narrative and read as a commentary on slavery, but not often enough treated as a philosophical tool that engages both Marxist feminism and more recent theories of biocapitalism and biopower.

Shelly Wilcox (San Francisco State University): "New Directions in Feminist Environmental Philosophy: Towards a Feminist Urban Environmental Ethic"

Few North American environmental philosophers have considered the urban environment to be a proper subject of moral inquiry, and those who have acknowledged cities typically portray them as a primary source of environmental evils, such as consumerism, pollution, and alienation from nature. Recently, however, some feminist philosophers have begun to criticize this anti-urban bias in environmental ethics. They contend that mainstream environmentalism has a long history of association with sexism, racism, and nativism, and turning a blind eye to cities does little to distance environmental ethics from these pernicious prejudices. Moreover, they argue, many urban issues are ecologically significant, both to the millions of people who live in metropolitan areas and to the larger biotic systems in which cities are embedded, and simply ignoring cities or dismissing them as intrinsically ecologically unsound will not solve these problems. Thus, they urge environmental ethicists to develop new ethical theories capable of articulating our moral obligations concerning cities and guiding our practical responses to urban environmental problems, such as blight, environmental racism, suburbanization and sprawl, lack of green space, unsustainable consumption, pollution, and the displacement of non-human animals.

My paper answers this call by developing a feminist urban environmental ethic. I begin by evaluating civic environmentalism, the main theory on offer in nascent field of urban environmental ethics. Civic environmentalism derives an account of our urban environmental obligations from civic republican citizenship theory, originally developed in the writings of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. I raise three concerns about this view as formulated by its best known proponents, Andrew Light and Richard Dagger. First, civic environmentalism is overly provincial: although Light and Dagger acknowledge that many of the environmental problems associated with large cities, such as pollution and unsustainable greenhouse gas emissions, have far reaching impacts, they provide no means for assuring that the interests of distant affected communities will be taken seriously in local decision-making processes. Second, civic environmentalism overemphasizes urban environmental duties to the exclusion of environmental rights, thereby obscuring issues of environmental injustice. Third, civic environmentalism sets the scope of our urban environmental obligations too narrowly, excluding duties to noncitizen residents and many urban nonhuman animals.

Since I conclude that civic environmentalism cannot yield a satisfactory urban environmental ethic, I also develop a more promising theory. My account, which draws upon ecofeminist and feminist justice theories, has several advantages over civic environmentalism. First, it recognizes that urban practices often involve the externalization of environmental costs and it yields environmental obligations that extend beyond municipal boundaries. Second, my account acknowledges the broader socioeconomic context of urban environmental problems, including pervasive sexist, racist, and nativist attitudes and practices, and it emphasizes environmental rights and environmental justice for all urban residents, regardless of their citizenship status. Finally, my account theorizes our moral obligations to nonhuman urban animals, independent of their perceived value to humans. By developing this feminist account, my paper both fills a problematic gap in environmental philosophy and identifies several promising new directions for feminist environmental ethics and political philosophy.