

ABSTRACTS FOR CONTRIBUTED PANELS

Analytical Feminism

Organizer: *Ann E. Cudd, University of Kansas*

The past editors of two special issues of *Hypatia* on analytical feminism (1995 and 2005) and the current president of the Society for Analytical Feminism would like to propose a panel that revisits this topic. The panel will address the reasons why the editors of these volumes proposed them, the ways in which analytical feminism has grown since these volumes were published, the impact that analytical feminism has had on philosophy to date, and the work that we believe still needs to be done to accomplish the goals we set for these volumes as well as any new goals we may have developed.

Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas): “Analytical Feminism: The Founding Issue(s)”

The first special issue on analytical feminism, edited by Ann E. Cudd and Virginia Klenz, followed by only four years the founding of the Society for Analytical Feminism at the 1991 Central APA meeting in Chicago. In her paper for this panel, Cudd will explore the motivations and rationale for founding the Society as well as its reception at the time from feminists in the profession. The paper will then connect the process of soliciting and editing the articles in the special issue to those concerns to see how the papers responded to those concerns. Finally, the paper will discuss how the founding issues for analytical feminism have been addressed, received, and in some ways rejected by the larger community of feminists on the one hand and philosophers on the other.

Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College, Norco): “A Productive Partnership: Analytical Feminism, Ethics, and Epistemology”

The Society for Analytical Feminism has always housed feminists working in many different traditional areas of philosophy, since its key organizing principle has been a shared approach rather than an area of philosophy. As a result of this, the Society has provided a particularly fruitful opportunity for conversation among ethical/political and epistemological analytical feminists. Crasnow’s paper will explore the ways analytical feminism has developed in these areas by tracing the inter-area influences through the *Hypatia* special issues, conferences, and other venues in which analytical feminism has been represented. The paper will finish with some suggestions about what other issues might be worth exploring and what future developments we might expect from analytical feminists.

Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario): “Analytical Feminism: A Canadian Perspective”

While the Society for Analytical Feminism has a number of Canadian members, a Canadian branch of the society has not emerged. So unlike the Society for Women in Philosophy which has a Canadian sister organization, CSWIP, or the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy, the Society for Analytical Feminism exists only in the United States. I will suggest that this is because Canadian feminists don’t so easily divide between the continental and analytical approaches to philosophy. For Canadian feminist philosophers the society stands out as an example of what analytical approaches have to offer feminist philosophy, but the “analytic feminist” identity has not been widely adopted. My hypothesis is that this has to do with both the smaller size of the Canadian feminist philosophy community and the need to make community across the French-English linguistic divide. Conferences themed on “analytic feminism” seem to leave Quebec feminists out of the picture. My comments will draw on the society’s conference held in Canada at the University of Western Ontario “Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition,” in June 2004.

Anita Superson (University of Kentucky): “Strategies for Making Feminist Philosophy Mainstream Philosophy”

One of the goals that Samantha Brennan and I, in our guest edited volume of *Hypatia* on analytical feminism (2005), and Sharon Crasnow and I, in our anthology on analytical feminism and its contributions to traditional philosophy (in progress), have had was to make work in analytical feminism read by nonfeminist philosophers. I believe that this issue is connected to the representation of women through all ranks and in “top ten” departments in philosophy, discussed in Sally Haslanger’s recent paper that was widely circulated. Although we are making some

headway, I believe that much work still needs to be done, work that should not stop until we see our representation reach equality. In my paper, I will suggest some strategies for closing the divide between what's seen strictly as feminist work (and so put aside), and what's seen as "real philosophy."

Situating Feminist Epistemology in 2009

Organizer: *Nancy Daukas, Guilford College*

Chair: *Libby Potter, Mills College*

The twenty-fifth anniversary of *Hypatia* seems an ideal occasion for taking stock of where things stand in feminist philosophy. Without attempting to be exhaustive, this panel would reflect on feminist epistemology historically and in relation to non-feminist philosophy, both broadly, and more narrowly, by focusing on several main trends. We wish to create a space for wide-ranging discussion that would ultimately look toward the future through historically-grounded reflection on the present.

Nancy Daukas (Guilford College): "Is 'Naturalized Epistemology' Still Useful for Feminists?"

Quine's work has had a profound influence on 'mainstream' and feminist epistemologies—through the underdetermination thesis and holism, which continue to serve feminist epistemology well; and through the 'naturalistic' turn. Despite Quine's reductive naturalism, as an area, 'naturalized epistemology' stretched to include a range of non-traditional approaches. For several decades, adopting the 'naturalized' label served some feminist work well. Recently, however, the narrow, reductive interpretation has reemerged to dominate—even define—non-feminist 'naturalized epistemology'. As we look forward, what does this mean for 'feminist naturalized epistemology'? Strategically, is it time for feminists to explicitly reject the 'naturalized' label? Or, to reclaim it?

Juli Thorson Eflin (Ball State University): "Feminist Virtue Epistemology"

Although not feminist and not growing out of feminism, responsibilist virtue epistemology is not at odds with feminism as is reliabilist virtue epistemology (e.g. Sosa and Greco). Looking back we note that responsibilist virtue epistemology borrows ideas, distinctions and solutions from feminist epistemology usually without explicitly stating them as feminist. A forward-looking project, however, focuses on the degree to which feminism and virtue epistemology support each other. Since 'virtue' is a success term, I consider how virtue epistemology provides additional ways for feminists to conceptualize objectivity.

Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University): "What is Distinctive About Feminist Epistemology (at 25)?"

Determining what makes feminist epistemology distinctive at this time requires shifting the focus from the term "feminist" to the term "mainstream." While mainstream epistemology (like feminist epistemology) encompasses a variety of interests and projects, there is remarkable consistency in the mainstream's unwillingness or inability to incorporate feminist work, perhaps even to comprehend it. Working from this basic marker of differentiation, I examine the distinctly enhanced understandings of four important features of epistemology (or of epistemological theorizing) that distinguish feminist work: situating epistemology; epistemological reflexivity; starting concepts and questions; and epistemic normativity.

Moral Issues in Everyday Motherhood

Organizer: *Sara Goering, University of Washington, Seattle*

In the past, *Hypatia* articles have dealt with mothering issues primarily in respect to concerns of justice between women (e.g., the effects of hiring domestic help for childcare—Joan Tronto's "The Nanny Question in Feminism" *Hypatia* 17(2): 34-51, 2002; and the troubling heteronormativity of traditional parenting arrangements—Card, "Against Marriage and Motherhood" *Hypatia* 11(3): 1-23, 1996). To date, however, much less philosophical work has been written on how mothers navigate—or should navigate—everyday moral issues in relation to their own families and friends. In this panel, we aim to focus our philosophical attention on what might be considered mundane issues of motherhood, issues that nonetheless carry significant moral charge. That they are routine and common does not imply that they are morally uninteresting.

We begin to fill this gap in feminist theorizing with discussion of three issues of everyday mothering; abstracts for the individual papers follow.

1. what to buy or allow to be bought for your kid (and the significance of preserving familial relationships with relatives vs. teaching a child about over-consumption or sexist play);
2. how to understand our inclination to brag about failures in mothering to our friends, family, and co-workers, and what that might mean about ideologies of motherhood and professional life; and
3. what to say about whether motherhood requires impartiality *between* children, and how the debates about partiality in morality translate into the individual family structure.

Karen Emmerman (University of Washington, Seattle): “Irreconcilable Differences? An Environmental Ethicist Mother Takes on the Grandparents”

Becoming a mother creates a variety of tensions in one’s life. The balance between work and home becomes more complicated than ever, the struggle for an equitable distribution of labor in one’s household intensifies, and the nuances of relationships with friends and family grow ever more complex. The problem of motherhood and conflicts between one’s own values and one’s relationships with others is under-theorized. How, for example, are we to react when our child’s grandparents present yet another gigantic plastic toy despite our repeated pleas that we not treat having had a child as a consumer event? How do we balance our environmental values with the grandparents’ desire to show love and affection by procuring the latest and greatest toy for our child’s birthday? How do we manage the conflicts that arise when the values we teach our children directly contradict the way of life of his grandparents? Relationships with our family members can be among the most important in our lives yet managing these relationships in the midst of differences in fundamental values can be extraordinarily complicated. What is a mother to do? In my paper I plan to explore both the nature and variety of conflicts that can arise in the context of mothering between one’s relationships with others and one’s own environmental values and then consider the question of just how much we ought to control what we allow others to buy for our children.

Sara Goering (University of Washington, Seattle): “Bragging about Failure: Mothers Who Take Delight in Confessing Their Shortcomings”

Though feminists have highlighted the ways in which mothers are constrained by a relatively rigid ideology of motherhood that requires self-sacrifice and full attention to our children’s needs, most mothers I know (myself included) leap at the first opportunity to confess their mothering failures. When my infant son fell off the counter in his bumbo seat, I could barely wait to call a friend to report this travesty. Why? We might speculate that mothers are no longer bound by the ideology that requires mothering perfection, or perhaps we are, and we simply wish to put other mothers at ease around us. But these explanations are not fully satisfying, for a number of reasons. In my discussion, I consider whether at least part of our glee in reporting such failures stems from the desire to fit (or appear to fit) better into norms of professional life. That is, we *brag* about mothering failures as a way to secure our place in professional life. “I’m such a bad mother” may imply “I’m really the sort of person who is better at traditional intellectual work,” as if good mothering and a good professional career cannot co-exist. If so, this suggests that despite some advances (wider availability of maternity leave, possibility of stopping the tenure or promotion clock, etc.), we have a long way to go to achieve equity in the workplace.

Claudia Mills (University of Colorado, Boulder): “Playing Favorites”

Even as feminist philosophers, and others, have argued against the impossible and disingenuous ideal of impartiality, and in particular argued for a degree of permissible partiality *toward* friends and family, impartiality seems to remain an ideal of relationships *within* the family. It is an unchallenged truism that a mother is supposed to love all of her children the same: the horror of *Sophie’s Choice* lies in Sophie’s desperate violation of this fundamental commandment of motherhood. I explore the source and force of our attachment to this last bastion of impartiality, locating it in the importance of relationships that are unchosen and love that is unearned. I argue in favor of relinquishing our insistence on equality in parental love in favor of an ideal of parental love that is absolute rather than relative. A parent is committed—insofar as such a commitment is even possible—to love that is unconditional, not to love that is equal.

Neurofeminism

Organizer: *Anne Jacobson, University of Houston*

We propose a panel related to our current project, the edition of a volume of neurofeminism. The panel will have three to five speakers. In addition to the three of us, we may add two speakers from the book's other authors. In our discussion, we will focus on issues that have been important in feminist philosophical discourse during the time *Hypatia* has served as a standard bearer for the field.

With the recent advances in imaging technology, the last decade has witnessed an explosion of work on human cognitive and affective functioning. There are, however, serious questions about how to interpret the evidence from neuroscience, an area that, in some respects, appears to be just as sensitive to preconceived notions of sex-differences as other fields. It is, therefore, time to apply a feminist perspective to this burgeoning field of study. New directions to be considered include the following:

- use recent research to question past stereotypes and earlier valuations.
- emphasize new causal accounts that increase our understanding of gender differences or similarities.
- expose androcentric or otherwise questionable assumptions and concepts that inform scientific research.
- draw attention to the ways in which neuroscience has addressed (or failed to address) embodied experience.
- provide a relational account of ethical issues in neuroscience.
- present a new perspective on already developed feminist issues.
- explore insights from studies of non-human animals.
- address political issues, understood generally, from a new viewpoint.

Robyn Bluhm (Old Dominion University): “Beyond Neurosexism: Is it Possible to Defend the Female Brain?”

Throughout the 1980s, feminist scientists and theorists published critiques of research on gender differences that repudiated the biological determinism upon which much of this research was based. Despite this, a too-simple view of the relative effects of innate and cultural factors on brain structure and function is still accepted by many scientists and, the primary focus of this paper, is prevalent in dozens of popular science books. In this paper, I examine a subset of these books that claim to empower women through providing knowledge of “how women’s brains work” and argue that there is good reason to see these books as reinforcing negative gender stereotypes, despite their intention to the contrary.

Anne Jacobson (University of Houston): “On Constructing the New Science of the Self”

One important project for feminist philosophers has been the construction of philosophical views that provide an alternative to the Cartesian picture of the detached and isolated self. Some recent philosophers of cognitive science have worked to add the idea of an embodied self to the repertoire of cognitive neuroscience. Jacobson will defend this work from a recent, strong objection, while maintaining that it continues to employ conceptual devices that belong to the earlier, Cartesian cognitive science. Jacobson seeks to add in two elements that take our understanding of cognitive neuroscience much further away from Descartes: representation and normativity.

Heidi Maibom (Carleton University): “In a Different Voice?”

One very powerful critique of theories of moral development is that of Carol Gilligan. One interpretation of her work is that the ethics of care rests on empathy and/or sympathy. Her comments in *In a Different Voice*, and subsequent interpretations appear to presuppose that there are significant sex differences in the propensity to experience empathy. Maibom looks at some of the recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience to determine whether this is true. She will argue that meta-studies still indicate that there are no sex differences in propensity to experience empathy, but will focus on a number of related findings—from empathy with pain and psychopathy—that indicate some intriguing differences between the sexes, and discuss what consequences such findings might have for one interpretation of the ethics of care.

Gaming the Other: Feminist Perspectives on the Other as “Animal” or “Disabled”

Organizer: *Stephanie Jenkins, Pennsylvania State University*

Interrogating the subjectivity and subjection of the “other” to the able-bodied, non-animal man has captured the attention of feminist scholarship. In 1991, *Hypatia* published a special issue on ecofeminism. A decade later, *Hypatia* produced a special issue on feminism and disability. These two feminist methodologies, though seemingly separated by time and subject, demonstrate the attention to marginalized others in feminist philosophy. Our panel will argue that we need to revisit both ecofeminism and disability theory, in order to examine the process of otherization and to identify sites of interaction of animal studies and disability studies within feminist theory. A feminist future that recognizes and works with disability studies and animal studies intrinsically and intimately, holds the promise to respond to feminisms’ commitment to be incessantly and persistently border-crossing, borders of identity, representations, and subjectivity.

Feminism has been concerned with the animal as other. Some theorists have taken up the question of the animal in ecofeminist theory, while others critique the depiction of women as animal others. Similarly, feminists concerned with disability have examined able-bodied norms and shed light on the lives of women with disabilities. Some feminists have used disability as a metaphor to describe the effects of patriarchy. Moreover, feminist disability theorists continue to fight the dehumanization that takes place in comparisons of those with disabilities to animal capacities.

Our aim is to identify and problematize the division between the lives of others that are valued with those to which our society is ethically indifferent. We will consider the others that exist at what Eva Feder Kittay has called the “margins of moral personhood.” We will examine the ways in which animals and individuals with disabilities are constructed as “null others,” as Judith Butler recently termed the others whose lives are not worth grieving because they were never recognized as lives. Our panel asks: What kinds of lives are valued? What kinds of beings are marked as human or non-human? What maintains that distinction? To begin answering these questions, the future of feminism must confront the complex relationship between women, animals, and disability. Our panel promises to traverse a territory occupied by different animals (often-times feminized), disabled people (often-times made into “games”), and a critical look at conversations between disability rights activists and animal rights activists in order to contribute to *Hypatia*’s commitment towards fashioning a feminist future informed by feminist legacies.

Sushmita Chatterjee (Augustana College): “Feminist Transnationalism and the Question of the Animal”

Feminism has been centrally concerned with questions of the animal “other,” whether in encountering “real” animals in ecofeminist or vegetarian movements, or in critiquing the ploy which depicts the “other” gender, race, class, sexual affinity etc. as animals. The “other” in any binary schema is animalized. Working with a border-crossing ethos, feminist theory and politics have actively sought to transgress binary thinking and create a transnational movement. In my paper, I work towards theorizing vibrant feminist transnationalism by working through the binary of man/animal. In pursuit of this aim, I work with Gilles Deleuze’s “becoming animal” to draw out its implications for feminist politics. I emphasize Deleuze’s “becoming animal” as providing the theoretical energy for vibrant transnational politics. The movement from Aristotle’s “man as a political animal” to Deleuze’s “becoming-animal” is a movement from the establishment of the polis, to the questioning of its rationale. Transgressing the man/animal binary is tantamount to transgressing a framing of politics and the State which keeps us within the status-quo of the present.

Stephanie Jenkins (Pennsylvania State University): “Shaking Hands with the Evil One: Engaging Animality and Disability Studies and the Meaning of ‘Worse Off’”

The confrontation between the animal rights and disability rights movements is often viewed in reference to the public confrontations between Peter Singer and Harriet McBryde Johnson. Disability activists express concern that animal advocates value the lives of non-human animals over the lives of disabled humans and ask if Singer really believes that McBryde Johnson would have been “better off” dead. Animal activists are confounded by the refusal of disability advocates like McBryde Johnson to extend their compassion to the suffering of animals on their plates.

This paper will seek to question the assumed mutual exclusivity of these positions and examine the intersections of animal and disability rights positions. In this endeavor, I will consider the role of animality and disability in the process of otherization, rather than further efforts to compare the abilities of individuals with cognitive disabilities to animals. I will argue that a feminist understanding of embodiment and care ethics will highlight how both animals and humans with disabilities are two forms of otherness that are central to judgments concerning who counts as a person and the kinds of lives that have ethical significance. I will draw on the work of ecofeminist philosophy and feminist disability studies to argue that feminists must interrogate the boundaries of moral concern and indifference in order to understand and question definitions of the human.

Evan Seehausen (Rutgers University): “Agent Other: Mute Protagonists in Video Games”

Video games have come into their own as a popular medium in the last decade. In addition, the tools for creating and distributing games have become easier to use, allowing for the creations of games by people who would have previously been marginalized by the games industry. It is important that feminist theorists both address the growing cultural influence of video games as well as their emergence as a developing artistic and theoretical medium. This paper will look at the ways in which video games both depend on and have the potential for subverting the ways in which those with communicative disabilities are othered. By exploring several “classic” games, I will track the use and implications of the silent/mute protagonist in games and the ways that such muteness is used to alternately deprive the character of agency and increase player identification. From there, I will show how recent games by independent developers attempt to explore and subvert that process.

Initially, the muteness of the protagonist allowed players to more easily project their motivations and desires onto the form of the otherwise highly abstracted avatar. The protagonists in such games become simply objects to be manipulated by the player, rather than complete characters. That process reveals much about the roles that verbal expression and a lack thereof can play in the process of othering individuals with communicative disabilities. From there, I will move to two more recent independent video games (*Calamity Annie* and *Gunmute*), where the creators have created mute characters who retain their specificity and ability to communicate, primarily through increasing a sense of the character’s embodiment. Finally, I will emphasize the ways in which the use of the silent protagonist has been used to reinforce a type of heteronormative, ableist male gaze, while showing the ways that the protagonists of *Calamity Annie* and *Gunmute* alternatively mimic and subvert such expectations. Throughout the paper, I will make use of the work of scholars in disability and feminist studies, as well as the writings of Anna Anthropy (the creator of *Calamity Annie*) and other game theorists who write from the margins.

Feminist Science, Sexual Health, and Transnational Policies

Organizer: Kari Lerum, University of Washington, Bothell

Feminist theorists have long been interested in how scientific discourses, practices, and politics impact women’s well-being and feminist and social justice projects more broadly. The topic began garnering serious feminist attention in the 1980s, and *Hypatia* dedicated its first special issues on the topic of “Feminism and Science” in Fall 1987 and Spring 1988, both edited by Nancy Tuana. In part I, authors including Sandra Harding Luce Irigaray, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Ruth Ginzberg, et al., theorize “the ways in which science is affected by and reinforces sexist biases.” (Tuana, 1988). These authors also contemplated whether science itself is sexed and whether women would do science differently (Tuana, 1988). In part II of this series, Ruth Hubbard outlines the role of politics in science (from the laboratory to the dissemination of knowledge), and several other authors turn toward critiquing the actual practice of science, calling for, among other things, a better understanding of the “assumptions scientists actually hold to when they decide between conflicting generalizations” (Potter 1998, 30).

In an effort to move beyond polarizing and generalizing debates about science as good or bad, feminist or anti-feminist, a second *Hypatia* special issue on “Feminist Science Studies,” edited by Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Alison Wylie, appeared in Winter 2004. As Nelson and Wylie write in their introduction to this issue, a way out of this polarization is for “feminist practitioners in the sciences and in science studies” ... to “turn ... their attention to the details of substantive case studies” (2004, ix). In this issue, Nancy Tuana examines how hegemonic scientific knowledge works to produce ignorance around women’s sexuality, arguing that “women’s bodies and pleasures

provide a fertile lens for understanding the workings of power/knowledge-ignorance in which we can trace who desires what knowledge“ (Tuana, 2004, p. 198). In this same issue, Sandra Harding pushed researchers to remember that all knowledge production, including not just science but also the philosophy of science, is born out of specific social contexts, and is “fully participant in the social relations of the day” (Harding, 2004, p 39).

This panel will build upon and extend the insights of these and other feminist philosophers, revisiting the question: “how might science be done differently and better; what constructive responses follow from feminist critiques?” (Nelson and Wylie, 2004). Through empirical examples of transnational gender and health interventions, the panel will address intersections, ironies, and contradictions in the deployment of scientific and feminist claims and policies in global sex, sexuality, and health arenas. The panel would consist of three presenters (or teams of presenters), each of whom will evaluate specific empirical and substantive cases of sexual health practices through a feminist lens.

**Amanda Swarr, Jaye Sablan, and Kai Kohlsdorf (Women Studies, University of Washington, Seattle):
“Transnational Transgender Medical Interventions”**

This paper will theorize the movement and application of medical discourses concerned with transsexuals through a transnational lens, exploring definitions of “true transsexuals” and universal Standards of Care in comparative context in the global North and South.

Kari Lerum (Interdisciplinary Arts & Sciences, University of Washington, Bothell; Women Studies, University of Washington, Seattle): “Assessing the Effectiveness of State, National, and International Anti-Trafficking Legislation”

This paper will compare the Washington State anti-trafficking legislation with national and international anti-trafficking efforts, drawing connections with cultural logics around gender, sexuality, labor and labor rights, and immigration.

Shari Dworkin (Social and Behavioral Sciences and Center for AIDS Prevention Studies, University of California, San Francisco): “How Is Feminism Reshaping (For Better or For Worse) the Response to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic? What Else Needs to Be Done?”

This paper will illustrate advances in the operationalization of feminist empowerment principles in the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, using three case studies from the HIV/AIDS prevention realm (female condoms, microenterprise, masculinity and gender equity).

Writing Against Heterosexism: Postscripts

Organizer: Bonnie Mann, University of Oregon

In winter of 2007, *Hypatia's* special issue, *Writing Against Heterosexism*, was published. The issue was three years in the making, having been conceived just before the 2004 elections, in part as a response to the intense national attention that had been focused on the lack of basic civil rights for sexual and gender minorities. It was the vision of both lesbian and heterosexual feminist thinkers associated with *Hypatia* and FEAST, who wished to challenge the relative inactivity of heterosexual allies of sexual and gender minorities in the face of a flurry of state constitutional amendments enshrining discrimination against sexual and gender minorities in constitutional law.

Now less than two years later, the context for discussions of heterosexism has apparently changed. The election of Barack Obama seems to some to have ushered in a new era of progressive politics and tolerance in the U.S. Even as proposition 8 passed and was upheld in California, a wave of marriage reform is hitting the Northeastern United States, as more and more states legalize same-sex marriage and/or agree to recognize such marriages performed in other states—and civilization shows no signs of collapsing). A different tone and sensibility now marks U.S. foreign policy, as the hyper-masculine win-at-all-costs mentality of the last administration is shelved and a gentler, more thoughtful face is put on American maneuverings internationally, though whether this constitutes actual policy change or window dressing is a matter of dispute.

Writing Against Heterosexism: Postscripts, is an effort to take stock of these developments, and get our bearings in this new political landscape. Panel participants include the two editors of the volume: Joan Callahan and Bonnie Mann; and three contributors to the volume: Ann Ferguson, Chris Pierce, and Margaret Denike.

Joan Callahan (University of Kentucky): “Same-Sex Marriage and the Problem of Dirty Hands”

Many feminists argue that marriage is a morally bad institution and, therefore, GLBT activists should not be agitating for inclusion in it. But does this really follow from the moral defects of the institution of marriage? Or might it be the case that the best moral alternative currently available is doing all that we can do to ensure that same-sex couples are able to fully participate in the institution of marriage?

Ann Ferguson (University of Massachusetts-Amherst): “Why the Gay Marriage Issue May be a Trap for GLBT and Feminist Activists”

Why is gay marriage a problematic political goal for progressive gays and lesbians? How does pursuing this goal ignore or occlude the class issues and racism that mark the social and political arrangements more broadly, such as the lack of health care for all?

Chris Pierce (North Carolina State University): “The Right to Marry”

As the political landscape has changed, and the “liberal” courts have made some progress vis-à-vis gay marriage, have Obama and his democratic followers changed as well, or do Sartre’s observations about the anti-semitic still seem to capture a great deal about heteronormativity today? And why is the right to marry still controversial in feminist circles?

Margaret Denike (Carleton University): “From Same-Sex Marriage to Polygamy: The Anatomy of a Moral Panic”

Should, and how should, the state intervene in polygamous communities in Canada and the U.S.? How does the moral panic generated by the presence of these communities affect GLBT activism, and particularly the homonormative formations that dominate its recent campaigns?

Bonnie Mann (University of Oregon): “From Mad Boy on Steroids to Responsible Father: Heterosexism and The New Manhood”

Part of Obama’s election strategy, it seems, was to consciously project a very different kind of manhood than that embraced by the Bush administration. Does the “new” masculinity of the responsible father bode well or ill for a recision of the anti-homosexual panic that gripped the country in 2003-2004?

From *Hypatia* 1989: The Fabulous Burgeoning of Feminist Bioethics

Organizer: Laura Purdy, Wells College, and Helen B. Holmes, Independent Scholar

This panel looks back at the first organized steps toward feminist bioethics, and briefly chronicles its flowering since then. Panelists Purdy, Donchin, Sherwin, and Holmes contribute their own takes on important developments in the field. Each panelist will speak for 10-20 minutes, and we will break between speakers to encourage audience participation.

Laura Purdy (Wells College) will introduce the panel and participants, briefly recounting the genesis of the two special *Hypatia* issues on feminist bioethics (*Feminist Ethics & Medicine, Ethics & Reproduction*), and sketching out where she thinks the field needs to go.

Anne Donchin (Emerita, Indiana University and Purdue University at Indianapolis): “Shifting Concerns: The Commodification of NRTs”

Following Laura Purdy’s introduction, Ann Donchin will consider the development of reproductive technologies. Twenty years ago when she wrote “The Growing Feminist Debate over the New Reproductive Technologies” for *Hypatia*, reproductive technologies were still in their embryonic stages. Anxieties about the offspring of those born

of IVF were rife; now the first IVF baby is mother to a seemingly normal child conceived the old-fashioned way. Anxieties have now turned to the ever-increasing array of interventions that IVF facilitates, and, for feminists, to the need for suitable theoretical frameworks for analyzing and regulating them. At issue are conflicting goals: ensuring women's reproductive freedom, their broader welfare and that of their children, and access to basic reproductive care, both in the U.S. and in the global South. Her contribution will focus on intersections between these concerns and a growing issue that cries out for attention, the escalating commodification of reproductive and genetic services.

Carolyn McLeod (University of Western Ontario): "Relational Conscience: The Growth of Relational Theory in Feminist Bioethics"

Feminists have found it useful to analyze the meanings of concepts in bioethics (e.g., autonomy) from a relational perspective: that is, a perspective according to which social relations not only potentially limit moral agency but also help to create it and make it recognizable. Concepts in bioethics that have yet to be put under a feminist relational lens should be put under this lens, which is what I will do for conscience in this talk. There is a dominant view about conscience in bioethics, according to which having a conscience involves being compelled to honor one's own moral principles for the sake of one's "integrity" (i.e., inner unity). I will question from a feminist relational perspective whether this view makes sense.

Helen B. (Becky) Holmes (Independent Scholar): "Results After 1989: Communally Creative, Distressingly Disregarded"

With this talk Becky Holmes will wrap up the panel, celebrating how the community of *Hypatia* scholars helped to jumpstart organized feminist bioethics, in particular FAB (International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics). She will also demonstrate that bioethics still fails to take the methods of feminist clinical research ethics proposed in the *Hypatia* volumes seriously, showing how androcentric two representative areas of research (medication for AIDS and gene therapy) continue to be.

Boredom, Depression, Irritation, and Forgiveness: Feminism and Moral Psychology

Organizer: Ingra Schellenberg, University of Washington, Seattle

The study of moral psychology is relatively new within philosophy, and yet is currently undergoing several important and exciting changes. No longer limited to just explorations of moral agency, moral psychologists are now considering many of the normative issues that can be profitably informed by consideration of actual human psychology. Given its openness to new methods (e.g. engagement with empirical data and phenomenological reports), as well as its intrinsic interdisciplinarity, it seems to us that there is an obvious overlap between work in moral psychology and feminism. Feminist approaches to moral psychology often attend to the psychological effects of oppression. They also call into question the cultural valuation of emotion(s), challenge strong contrasts between emotion and reason, pay close attention to emotions connected with human vulnerability, and treat the neglected topics in moral psychology as potentially connected to gender politics. *Hypatia* has contributed substantially to the development of the field of moral psychology. For example, in one important, early paper, Sue Campbell ('Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotion Expression', *Hypatia* 9.3 (1994) 46-65) argues that the dismissal of women's emotions has important political ramifications. More recently, Sylvia Burrow ('The Political Structure of Emotion: From Dismissal to Dialogue', *Hypatia* 20.4 (2005) 27-43) builds on Campbell's analysis, exploring the ways in which feminist methods of interpretation can help in understanding emotions. These papers, and several more of *Hypatia*'s publications in recent years, have been fundamental to the development of moral psychology.

The papers we plan to present are examples of the thematic expansion of moral psychology done from feminist approaches. We hope they will indicate some possibilities for future research that *Hypatia* will support.

Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University): “Living with Boredom”

The aim of this talk is to argue that the human capacity for boredom is philosophically interesting because it illuminates the kinds of problems that evaluators face just in being evaluators. Attention to boredom shifts our philosophical gaze from the ranking and end setting activities of evaluators to the temporal lives of evaluators who meet up with, spend time with, seek out value and act with respect to value-qualities.

At first glance, boredom may seem an unlikely place to look for any insight about evaluators. Almost any emotion one could name, other than boredom, bears some interesting connection to the capacities, concerns, and actions of evaluators. Boredom, however, rather than involving the activation of capacities that are linked with evaluation, appears to be the inactivation of those capacities. Evaluation appears to go off-line insofar as the bored find nothing worthy of positive or negative evaluation and often are at a loss to say what would not be boring. But why, one might want to know, do evaluators sometimes find it so difficult to engage with the world? The paper explores reasons why evaluators sometimes find the world not worth their attention, by examining some of the contexts of boredom.

Subsidiary aims of the essay are to challenge the “boredom as problem” approach to understanding boredom that is pervasive throughout the multi-disciplinary literature on boredom and to address particular puzzles about boredom, e.g., why meaningless diversions and “normative delinquencies” (from doodling during lectures to murder) are an especially attractive method of escaping boredom.

Victoria McGeer (Princeton University): “Moral Travel and the Narrative Work of Forgiveness”

In isolating the phenomenon of “genuine” forgiveness, philosophers generally hold the following elements of their analyses constant - the victim, the wrongdoer, the serious moral offence, and (hence) “justified” resentment that the victim “appropriately” overcomes. Within these constraints, they aim to understand the normative criteria for appropriate forgiveness and the psychological processes by which it can be achieved. Against these analyses, I argue that the psychological work of forgiveness is a species of “moral travel”:

It requires victims to open these fixed points in their narratives of injury to negotiation, so as not to remain stuck in telling repetitive and debilitating stories of resentful victimization. While not compromising their sense of what is just or appropriate, the work of forgiveness requires victims to enlarge their understanding of the nature of the offence, the wrongdoer and even themselves as putative victims. Such work is inherently open-ended, allowing victims to reconnect with the wrongdoer, but taking them towards a resolution that cannot be predicted in advance. This means there is no determinately right outcome to such work - hence, no outcome that can be uniquely identified with “genuine” forgiveness, making the philosophical analysis of this notion misguided. Still, philosophers importantly identify many normative criteria that victims must observe in forgiving well. These inform my final discussion of how virtues of character are involved in the work of forgiveness

Ingra Schellenberg (University of Washington, Seattle): “Depression and Irritation: Case Studies in Moral Moods”

In this talk, I will be offering a partial analysis of mood. Within the philosophical literature there has been very little discussion of moods. Among those who have taken a position, the dominant position is that moods are non-intentional mental states. I will be arguing against this view. Instead, I will argue that moods can be intentional, at least sometimes. I will attempt to diagnose the temptation to see moods as non-intentional by appealing to a distinction between what I call occasioning versus opportunistic intentional objects. I will argue that recognition of the potential intentionality of moods has several benefits. Significantly, it allows us to appreciate the moral place that moods can occupy in our lives. I will motivate this claim by a brief exploration of depression and irritation. Both are moods that are often seen as disproportionately experienced by women. I will argue that women’s experiences of depression and irritation often reflect an intentional relationship between the moods and the mood-experiencer’s environment, which is depressing and irritating.